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4 
Abstract 
 
 The fall of the Soviet Union in combination with the failures of the international 
community to intervene in the genocides of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda spurred a new 
enthusiasm for human rights as a wholly independent movement, termed the human rights wave. 
This paradigm shift, identified by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, was an embrace of human rights 
rooted in the redemption of past wrongs. This project is structured as a jurisprudential genealogy 
that will explore the human rights wave in the context of the Women’s Caucus for Gender 
Justice, a facet of the transnational women’s network, and their quest to mainstream sexual and 
gender based violence into law at the International Criminal Court.  
 Timing was essential to the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice’s formation before the 
Rome Conference. At the same time as the human rights wave characterized by Hoffmann 
emerged, a furor for anti-impunity prosecutions engulfed the focus of the international 
community. These two phenomena came together at a time in which organizing at the United 
Nations over gender issues was about to reach a fever pitch. The thirst for anti-impunity sparked 
a renewed interest in international criminal tribunals, resulting in the ad hoc tribunals and the 
International Criminal Court forming throughout the 1990s. This project argues that the 
confluence of these aforementioned events provided the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice 
with a fortuitous opportunity to ride the human rights wave and institutionalize gender in a way 
that other activists would not be able to accomplish in contemporary times.   
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6 
Introduction 
 
 The end of the Cold War distinctly altered the way in which civil society interacts with 
states: operating as tight networks, NGOs began to couple their activism with legal action. The 
failure of the international community to intervene in conflicts perpetuating human rights abuses 
— e.g. Rwanda and Yugoslavia — spurred a delayed embrace of interventionism justified by 
human rights. At the same time, the human rights movement adopted anti-impunity1 measures 
and sought to prosecute human rights violations. Both the widespread acceptance of human 
rights2 and the move toward the anti-impunity model were catalyzed by the breakdown of multi-
ethnic states and the resulting human rights violations. Human rights idealism, independent of 
other causes, and anti-impunity are both attempts to address past wrongs.  
Transnational advocacy networks, to use Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s 
terminology, have become ubiquitous in international activism. The goal of these networks is to 
alter the behavior of states and international organizations through the effective framing of issues 
to target audiences and by “pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring 
compliance with international standards.”3 While advocacy networks date back to the abolitionist 
campaigns against slavery, the establishment of the United Nations and the rapid growth of non-
governmental organizations catapulted transnational advocacy networks to the international 
spotlight in the late twentieth century. 
                                                
1 The move towards anti-impunity began earlier in Latin America as a response to the dictatorial regimes of the 
1970s and 1980s. 
2 See page ____ Hoffmann 
2 See page ____ Hoffmann 
3 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 3. 
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 This period of time provided fertile ground for the strengthening of the human rights 
movement. The unique development of this era, termed the ‘human rights wave’,4 is the result of 
the epochal ruptures of the late twentieth century.5 The transnational women’s network was the 
first modern network to grow from the fresh ground of the human rights wave. This network 
embraced the normative shift towards anti-impunity and over time incorporated sexual and 
gender based violence (SGBV) into their agenda. Their decision to advocate for the designation 
of SGBV as an international crime culminated in the foundation of the Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice (WCGJ) at the Rome Conference. This phenomenon would not have been 
possible without the confluence of significant ‘events’6 in the world. The nexus of NGO 
influence at United Nations conferences and the newfound model of anti-impunity that resulted 
in the creation of international criminal tribunals made it possible for the transnational women’s 
network to ride the human rights wave.  
The inclusion of SGBV into international humanitarian law, while not perfect, has been 
institutionalized into conceptions of what constitutes human rights violations. This project 
problematizes the normalized and asks how the WCGJ was able to develop as a robust network. 
Moreover, the WCGJ serves as an intriguing case study on the rise of human rights wave of the 
1990s. During this period of time, as Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann will argue, epochal ruptures 
catalyzed the re-evaluation of human rights and IHL — the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
failure of humanitarian interventions — while international human rights groups shifted to the 
anti-impunity model for operations. As this was unfolding, the transnational women’s network 
                                                
4 Author’s term. 
5 Referring to the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as the many failed humanitarian interventions 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s. See page 17. 
6 For lack of better terms, the three periods of time discussed in this project will be referred to as ‘events’.  
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became a powerful force at United Nations conferences and international criminal tribunals were 
institutionalized. I argue that the 1990s brought about a significant shift in thinking about 
human rights and canonized anti-impunity as a prevailing mechanism for the human rights 
movement. The WCGJ fortuitously arose from the confluence of these events, and given the 
post-Cold War political and institutional climate, was capable of altering the language of the 
Rome Statute. This particular situation is rather peculiar — SGBV was not an obvious choice for 
the transnational women’s network to adopt, nor were anti-impunity based innovations for 
international criminal law. It is critical to investigate the development of the WCGJ and their 
actions in order to explain the timing of the human rights wave in the 1990s. 
  In order to understand the specifics of three distinct, yet interdependent, events that 
provided for the foundation from which the Caucus emerged to adequately analyze the Women’s 
Caucus for Gender Justice. These three events are each subject to discussion in individual 
chapters: the transnational women’s network’s mainstreaming of Violence against Women into 
United Nations conferences, the rise of international criminal tribunals, and the Rome 
Conference itself. The deeply interconnected nature of these events, in conjunction with the 
normative shifts of the 1990s, made it possible for the transnational women’s network to flourish 
at this point in time. Given that the confluence of these three events are a reaction to a 
significant normative change in human rights, it is very unlikely that this phenomenon could be 
recreated in current times without a similar paradigm shift. The result of the transnational 
women’s network’s work was the mainstreaming of both Violence against Women and gender at 
non-women centric United Nations conferences, and the creation of sexual and gender based 
violence as a crime under international humanitarian law.  
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 There is a wide breadth of literature on the transnational women’s network at the United 
Nations, the rise of criminal tribunals, and the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice; however, 
little academic work yoking together these three interconnected events exists.7 As the 
International Criminal Court has gotten its sea legs and begins prosecutions, it is increasingly 
necessary to return to the work of the WCGJ and the transnational women’s network as a whole. 
This project is at its core a jurisprudential genealogy — it seeks to tell the story of the first 
modern human rights network that was transformed by the consequences of the epochal ruptures 
of the 1990s. The nature of a jurisprudential genealogy necessitates thick descriptions of events. 
This project will specifically analyze the work of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice to 
infuse feminist language into the Rome Statute in order to elevate the status of sexual and gender 
based violence in the international humanitarian law (IHL) hierarchy before the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). In addition to providing a robust timeline of a new era, this project will 
also investigate the reproducibility of this phenomenon: can other networks model their activism 
after the progression of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, or was the key to the WCGJ’s 
success their ability to ride the human rights wave of the post-Cold War era? I argue that due to 
the incredibly unique convergence of events, it is highly unlikely that a similar outcome can be 
achieved in contemporary times.  
 
 
 
                                                
7 Literature that discusses one or two of the three processes covered in this project exists. Janet Halley, for example, 
extensively covered both the ad hoc tribunals and the WCGJ at the ICC in “Rape at Rome,” but did not include a 
review of the transnational women’s network at United Nations conferences. This project aims to weave the three 
together.  
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Defining Sexual and Gender Based Violence 
A concrete conception of the terminology used in this paper is vital, as phrases like sexual 
and gender based violence, Violence against Women, and gender violence all carry very different 
meanings. This project deals with sexual and gender based violence, while also making reference 
to the movement against Violence against Women (VAW). These terms are, for the most part, 
interchangeable, but I have opted to use SGBV to describe the crimes discussed in this project, 
except for when referring to specific documents on VAW.8 The need to use SGBV becomes 
especially apparent in Chapter 3 when addressing the WCGJ’s attempt to incorporate ‘gender 
violence’ into the Rome Statute. Solely referring to SGBV crimes as sexual crimes erases “non-
sexual attacks on women or men based on their gender-defined roles”9 and insufficiently 
encompasses the full range of crimes discussed. Within this, the project will focus on SGBV 
crimes in the context of crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the mechanisms of IHL 
that emerged with the intent to end impunity for perpetrators.  
The phrase ‘sexual and gender based violence’ is unpopular in comparison to sexual 
violence, Violence against Women, or even gender violence. Data shows this: an n-gram graph10 
illustrates the growth of VAW and sexual violence in the late 1970s with peaks for VAW in 
1995 and 2005, the years of the Beijing and Beijing 10+ conferences. As for gender violence, the 
term is mostly unused, but it experienced mild growth in the 1990s to today, consistent with the 
WCGJ’s attempts to include gender violence in the Rome Statute. 
                                                
8 This will primarily occur in Chapter 1. 
9  Janet Halley, “Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive 
International Criminal Law,” Michigan Journal of International Law 30 (2008), 83. 
10 See Appendix, Figure 1. 
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 Rape and other forms of sexual and gender based violence have classically11 been 
associated as a natural byproduct of war, stemming from the conception of women and girls as 
the property of men. The aim of members in the transnational women’s network has been to 
depict SGBV itself as a serious war crime and crime against humanity. In this past century alone, 
there are numerous instances in which SGBV has been used to further military objectives — the 
rapes of 60,00012 Bosnian women in the former Yugoslavia, of 250,000 to 500,00013 women 
during the Rwandan genocide, and of 20,00014 Chinese women during the Nanking Massacre. 
A 2004 Médecins Sans Frontières report noted the that “systematic rape was used as part of the 
strategy of ethnic cleansing.”15 The slowly developing push to criminalize and prosecute SGBV 
by many in the transnational women’s network, coupled with the growing involvement of civil 
society in United Nations became a transformative aspect in the international tribunals.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 In the Bible: (1) “Their infants will be dashed to pieces before their eyes; their houses will be plundered, and their 
wives will be ravished.” Isaiah 13:16, describing the conquest of Babylon (emphasis added). (2) “For I will gather all 
the nations against Jerusalem to battle, and the city shall be taken and the houses looted and the women raped; half 
the city shall go into exile, but the rest of the people shall not be cut off from the city.” Zechariah 14:2, on the 
sufferings of Jerusalem (emphasis added).  
12 “Conflict Profiles: Bosnia,” Women Under Siege Project, last modified 8 February 2012, 
http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/bosnia.  
13 “Conflict Profiles: Rwanda,” Women Under Siege Project, last modified 8 February 2012, 
http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/rwanda.  
14 This statistic is hotly debated, but the IMTFE estimates that 20,000 rapes occurred in the first month of 
occupation. See: Judgment of November 4 1948, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 495. 
15 “Enough is Enough, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War,” Médecins Sans Frontières - United States of 
America, last modified 7 March 2004, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/ideaopinion/enough-
enough-sexual-violence-weapon-war.  
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Gender at the United Nations 
 The Women’s Caucuses, the group of focus in this project, is a prime example of a 
modern activist network. The transnational women’s network16 began to coalesce during the 
drafting of the Declaration for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
in 1967, but reached its organizing peak during the early to mid 1990s at particular United 
Nations conferences, to be covered in Chapter 1. Networks are formed voluntarily and are 
characterized by horizontal patterns of communication. Particularly in the case of the 
transnational women’s network, networks provide sources of reliable information for outsiders: 
“they are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often invoke 
individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding 
of their ‘interests.’”17 The communication between networks takes place in a dense web of 
informal and formal connections from within the group. Keck and Sikkink argue that while 
advocacy networks date back to the nineteenth century, contemporary networks are radically 
different and more far sweeping than their historic counterparts, given advances in technology. 
Without the robust organizing done by the transnational women’s network at United Nations 
conferences beginning in 1975, it is unlikely that the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice would 
have been primed to form at Rome and exert strong influence over issues of gender.  
The concept of a Women’s Caucus did not begin with the Women’s Caucus for Gender 
Justice: Women’s Caucuses originated at prior United Nations conferences and became the 
dominant mode of organization for the transnational women’s network. The International 
                                                
16 Transnational women’s networks in the context of this project refers to the sprawling group of women that 
organized at the United Nations Conferences (Chapter 1), the ad hoc tribunals (Chapter 2), and the Rome 
Conference (Chapter 3). 
17 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 9. 
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia experienced a similar situation. Unlike the 
Women’s Caucuses at UN conferences or the WCGJ, the ad hoc tribunals were influenced on 
issues of gender by a small number of legal experts. Two groups of experts issued reports on 
sexual and gender based violence in an attempt to impact United Nations insiders as the statutes 
were drafted.18 The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, much like the groups at the ICTY, was 
comprised of many feminist legal experts. The WCGJ was a subgroup of the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, but was autonomous and ran between 1997 and 2003.19 
Beginning with the first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), the WCGJ was the only coalition 
for NGOs concerned with women’s issues, and by the third meeting of PrepComI, the WCGJ 
was officially recognized. The WCGJ describes themselves as “a network of individuals and 
groups committed to strengthening advocacy on women's human rights and helping to develop 
greater capacity among women in the use of International Criminal Court and other mechanisms 
that provide women avenues of and access to different systems of justice.”20 The WCGJ credits 
its origin as a last-minute organizing attempt at the first PrepCom that drew inspiration from 
the Women’s Caucuses preceding it at Vienna, Cairo, and Beijing.21 Members of the WCGJ 
tended to be legal experts and often self-reported on their experiences in law reviews.22 The 
                                                
18 The Women in the Law Project (WILP), consisting of Laurel Fletcher, Karen Musalo, Diane Orentlicher, and 
Kathleen Pratt published “No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former 
Yugoslavia” in the Hastings Women’s Law Journal. Jennifer Green, Rhonda Copelon, Patrick Cotter, and Beth 
Stephens published “Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique,” also in the Hastings 
Women’s Law Journal. 
19 After 2003, the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice reinvented itself as the Women’s Initiative for Gender 
Justice, framed as an accountability network for the ICC on gender issues. 
20 “About,” Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, accessed 20 April 2017, 
http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/aboutcaucus.html.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Rhonda Copelon, Barbara Bedont, Katherine Hall-Martinez, Pam Spees, Valerie Oosterveld, among others, are 
all examples of feminist scholars involved in the WCGJ. 
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WCGJ intensely lobbied governments to mainstream gender and include sexual and gender 
based violence language in the Rome Statute. While the WCGJ was a feminist group, their 
ideology was not accepted by all feminists. For the most part, the WCGJ ascribes to structural 
feminism. Janet Halley, the Royall Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, characterizes the 
WCGJ’s approach to structural feminism as “a commitment to the view that the subordination 
of women is coextensive with male/female relations — is their structure. In a fully structuralist 
feminist view of sexuality, no sexual interaction between a man and a woman is free from the 
effects of male domination.”23 As we shall see, this approach was not readily accepted by both 
government delegations and liberal feminist members of the WCGJ. This project is first and 
foremost a jurisprudential genealogy, but this contentious version of feminism is not beyond 
critique.  
The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice would not have been able to firmly establish 
itself at the Rome Conference without the deep history of gender mainstreaming at previous 
United Nations conferences by the transnational women’s network. Gender mainstreaming was 
developed at the Nairobi Conference to incorporate women’s issues into the agendas of 
conferences and statutes of tribunals. Prior to the use of this strategy, gender was separated as 
subsets of other issues — honor,24 family, culture — and were not taken into the core of rights 
movements. As opposed to the segregation of women’s issues as “marginalized, [to the] 
peripheral backwater[s] of specialist women’s institutions,”25 gender mainstreaming strives for 
the institutional normalization of gender. Gender mainstreaming was formally defined in the 
                                                
23 Janet Halley, “Rape at Rome,” 91.  
24 The effect of linking honor and gender shall be discussed in this project, beginning with Hague Convention VI 
and continuing until the Rome Conference itself. See Chapters 2 and 3.  
25 Hilary Charlesworth, “Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United 
Nations,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 (2005), 1. 
 
 
15 
Beijing Platform for Action from the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women26 
and has since become codified into United Nations policy.27 In the Office of the Special Advisor 
on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women’s “Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview,” the 
Special Advisor adds that gender mainstreaming is not mutually exclusive with “specific targeted 
interventions to address women’s empowerment and gender equality.”28 Gender mainstreaming 
is a strategy towards achieving gender equality implemented in different fashions dependent on 
the activity. This strategy is quite straightforward: in creating any planned actions or policies, the 
gendered implications should be assessed and UN committees should strive for an increased 
representation of women. Since being brought into the Beijing Platform for Action, the concept 
of gender mainstreaming can be spotted throughout the international system. The World Health 
Organization, the U.N. Development Programme, the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Bank, and the 
International Labour Organization have all included gender mainstreaming into their policies.29 
Even further, gender mainstreaming has been incorporated into official European Union policy, 
and often adopted at the national level.30 As we shall see in Chapter 3, the Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice at Rome is a striking example of gender mainstreaming in action, and seriously 
aided the group’s objectives.  
                                                
26 Ibid. 2.  
27 Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Gender Mainstreaming: An 
Overview (New York: United Nations, 2002), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/e65237.pdf.  
28 Ibid. vi.  
29 Charlesworth, “Not Waving but Drowning,” 3.  
30 Ibid. 3. 
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Janet Halley coined the term ‘Governance Feminism’ in 200631 to describe a new style of 
feminist mobilization that rose to power in the 1990s, first “incremental[ly] but by now [is the] 
quite noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power.”32 
Halley describes how GFeminist legislation ‘piggybacks’ onto existing structures of power and 
influences them to adopt feminist slants. This process can clearly be seen in the United Nations 
conferences to be covered in Chapter 1, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Chapter 2, and the 
International Criminal Court in Chapters 3. Janet Halley’s “Rape at Rome: Feminist 
Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal 
Law” is a similar genealogy of GFeminists in the 1990s and their influence on the series of new 
international criminal tribunals. Halley’s article is critical of GFeminism and the structuralist-
feminist ideology that prevailed in the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice. Halley had few 
qualms with the achievements of GFeminism at Rome — the inclusion of women into 
international humanitarian law and international customary law (ICL). Instead, she is critical of 
the feminist universalism that guided the WCGJ. Halley defines structural feminism:  
In this view women are not a particular group of humanity but a universe of their 
own. In the new feminist universalist worldview, humanitarian law and 
international criminal law norms relating to armed conflict could be about women 
… It made ever more sense to look at the eruption of ethno-nationalist conflict in 
the Balkans, for instance, and to see and show it as a war against women. And it 
made ever more sense to describe that war without any acknowledgement that 
men died in it.33 
                                                
31 See: Janet Halley, Split Decisions (2006). 
32 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, Chantal Thomas, “From the International to the Local in 
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary 
Governance Feminism,” Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 29 (2006), 340. 
33 Halley, “Rape at Rome,” 6-7. 
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Halley’s main critique is of feminist universalism’s reduction of complex ethno-national 
conflicts34 to a ‘war-against-women’ mentality that seemingly sought to erase the suffering of 
men.  
 
The Fall of the Soviet Union and the Rise of the Human Rights Wave  
 This project argues that the concerted embrace of human rights as a wholly independent 
movement coincided with the beginning of the 1990s. The timing of this was essential to the 
foundation Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, and the transnational women’s network as a 
whole. The human rights wave of the 1990s can be characterized in many respects: the dramatic 
increase of international organizations, the newfound enthusiasm for anti-impunity and 
international criminal law, a focus on the amelioration of past wrongs. Academic work pinning 
the inception of modern human rights in other time periods, such as the 1970s, often fails to 
account for the aforementioned aspects of the 1990s. Locating the swell of the human rights 
wave in the 1990s is critical to the thesis of this project: without the distinct momentum made in 
this era, the impact of the WCGJ would likely be drastically lessened.  
Samuel Moyn’s widely popular book, The Last Utopia, differentiates modern human 
rights from older conceptions of rights, like those of the French and American Revolutions. 
Moyn identifies the rise of human rights as occurring in the 1970s — not from the 
Enlightenment or reactions to the Holocaust. Moyn does not deny that human rights may be 
traced to earlier philosophical ideas. Instead he asserts that the 1970s was when it entered into 
popular use after the failed uprisings in the Eastern Bloc, such as the 1968 Prague Spring in 
                                                
34 Most striking in Yugoslavia. 
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Czechoslovakia and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.35 Prior to the 1970s, ‘human rights’ 
struggles like those in the Eastern Bloc were too heavily intertwined in citizenship rights within 
the nation-state to succeed. Moyn also refutes the argument that human rights grew out of a 
reaction to the Holocaust: “Contrary to conventional consumptions, there was no widespread 
Holocaust consciousness in the post-war era, so human rights could not have been a response to 
it.”36 Moyn asserts that after the failure of capitalism, socialism, and anti-colonialism, the idea of 
human rights was the last utopian front. Moyn identifies 1977, and the years surrounding it, as 
the “year[s] of shocking and altogether unpredictable prominence of human rights.”37 This 
classification is based off of three key events: the Helsinki Accords, President Jimmy Carter’s 
inauguration, and Amnesty International’s Nobel Peace Prize win. Carter’s moral infusion of 
human rights into U.S. foreign policy placed the language of human rights onto a widely 
received national platform.38 The détente project of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, two years 
prior, infused human rights into the so-called “Third Basket” of the Helsinki Final Act.39 Moyn 
identifies a number of catalysts for the explosive popularity of human rights in the 1970s: 
The search for a European identity outside Cold War terms; the reception of 
Soviet and later East European dissidents by politicians, journalists, and 
intellectuals; and the American liberal shift in foreign policy in new, moralized 
terms, after the Vietnamese disaster. Equally significant, but more neglected, were 
the end of formal colonialism and the crisis of the postcolonial state.40 
                                                
35 Ibid. 136. 
36 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 8. 
37 Ibid. 13.  
38 “Without Carter, the phrase itself might never have exploded so spectacularly: even after she placed her op-ed 
pieces that helped Amnesty International publicize suffering prisoners in 1974, Laber recalled, “I did not use the 
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Moyn argues without the ‘canonization’ of human rights with Helsinki and Jimmy Carter, 
human rights would have likely remained on the peripheral backwaters of policy.41 
Moyn’s argument, while an alluring story, places the human rights wave twenty years too 
early and leaves out key parts of human rights history. In respect to the Holocaust, Moyn fails to 
discuss the Nuremberg (IMT) and Tokyo (IMTFE) trials’ contribution to international 
humanitarian law by prosecuting crimes against individual people at the international level. The 
Last Utopia makes little reference to the explosion of human rights organizations and the 
founding of international criminal tribunals, both phenomena of the post-Cold War era. Moyn’s 
book neglects to discuss the inception of the transnational women’s network that timidly began 
at the Mexico City Conference in 1975 and reached a fever pitch in the 1990s. If we are to take 
into account the pivotal role the transnational women’s network played as a movement and as the 
first modern network, Moyn’s framework cannot be convincingly be utilized. Instead, it is 
necessary to view the explosion of human rights, or the human rights wave, as an event of the 
early 1990s. 
The human rights wave as a post-Cold War phenomenon is aptly identified by Stefan-
Ludwig Hoffmann in his “Human Rights and History.” Hoffmann’s thesis pushes against 
Samuel Moyn’s ascription of the rise of human rights to the 1970s and asserts it actually occurred 
in the early 1990s. While human rights terminology was present in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
coexisted in conjunction with other “moral and political idioms like ‘solidarity’ and included 
competing notions of rights, which were in many ways still indebted to the legacies of socialism 
and anti-colonialism.”42 The 1990s was the point in time where the notion of individual human 
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rights became a “contested, irreplaceable, and consequential concept of global politics.”43 Prior to 
the early 1990s and following the Second World War, Hoffmann argues that no humanitarian, 
military, or political intervention was rationalized with the language of human rights and were 
due to realpolitik reasons.44 The emerging global human rights movement was not “the cause but 
the consequence of the epochal ruptures of the late twentieth century”45 — including the 
disintegration of both the Soviet Union and the collapse of Milošević’s Yugoslavia.  
 A cocktail of factors were responsible for the swell of the human rights wave in the early 
1990s: movements for Holocaust remembrance, the violent civil wars in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, 
the CNN effect of the twenty-four hour news cycle, and the Habermasian favoring of individual 
human rights over state’s rights to sovereignty.46 In both Rwanda and Srebrenica, the inability of 
UN peacekeepers to intervene was an “expression of the United Nations’ political failure and 
thereby the end of hopes placed in the organization to become more of a world government.”47 It 
was the political failure of international organizations in handling the collapse of multi-ethnic 
states and the following civil wars that led to the “belated embrace of the idea of human rights 
interventionism by the generation of baby boomers and student protesters.”48 The connection of 
Srebrenica to Holocaust remembrance — human rights violations to genocide — was historically 
new.49 
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 Hoffmann illustrates the effect of the post-Cold War emergence of individual human 
rights idealism on the theoretical approach to humanitarian intervention by using the Kosovo 
War (1998-9) as an example. Within this context, Hoffmann references the work of both Jürgen 
Habermas and Vaclav Havel. Following NATO's military intervention, Habermas penned an 
article regarding the transformation of international law into a law of global citizens and 
“identified the dilemma of human rights politics as having to act as if a fully institutionalized 
global civic society already existed, even though their very promotion was the objective of the 
military action.”50 Likewise, Havel used a similar line of argument in a speech before the 
Canadian Senate and House of Commons:  
This war places human rights above the rights of the state. The Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia was attacked by the alliance without a direct mandate from the UN. 
This did not happen irresponsibly, as an act of aggression or out of disrespect for 
international law. It happened, on the contrary, out of respect for the law, for a 
law that ranks higher than the law which protects the sovereignty of states. The 
alliance has acted out of respect for human rights, as both conscience and 
international legal documents dictate.51 
Hoffmann argues that this indicates the ‘breakthrough’ of human rights, in the late 1990s as 
opposed to the 1970s. 
 At the same time as humanitarian intervention began a new era, so did international 
humanitarian and human rights law. Just as how the atrocities in Rwanda and Yugoslavia served 
as a catalyst for intervention justified by human rights breaches, they sparked “the emergence of a 
new international criminal law and its institutions, and possibly the most significant legal 
accomplishment in human rights of the two decades since Bosnia.”52 Alongside the ad hoc 
tribunals, the subject of Chapter 2, the Vienna Declaration adopted by the World Conference on 
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Human Rights in 1993 “constituted a resurgence of the debate about the universality of human 
rights.”53 In contrast to the human rights conventions produced between the 1960s and the 
1980s that focused on decolonization, conventions throughout the 1990s distinctly centered on 
the criminal prosecution of ‘past wrongs’54 and anti-impunity measures. This fundamental shift 
in the way in which human rights are approached swept up the formation of the International 
Criminal Court in the human rights wave and propelled the Court and anti-impunity to the 
forefront of international criminal law. It is essential to adopt Hoffmann’s positive historical 
revisionist account of the human rights movement in order to examine the development of the 
transnational women’s network and the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice.  
 Kathryn Sikkink identifies the move to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses as a 
development of the early 1990s, aligning with Hoffmann’s representation of the emergence of 
human rights idealism. In describing this trend, Sikkink coins the term ‘the justice cascade,’ 
which characterizes the “shift in the legitimacy of the norm of individual criminal accountability 
for human rights violations and an increase in criminal prosecutions on behalf of that norm.”55 
Sikkink uses the term ‘cascade’ for this trend to capture “how the idea started as a small stream, 
but later caught on suddenly, sweeping along many actors in its wake.”56 Three kinds of 
prosecutions emerged from the justice cascade: international, foreign, and domestic.57 This 
project focuses on the first category, international,58 but does not examine the subset of hybrid 
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criminal tribunals.59 Despite the increased amount of human rights treaties entering into force, 
“it began to appear that human rights violations were getting worse, not better.”60 This was likely 
the result of the failure of the international community to prevent human rights abuses and the 
lasting impunity that existed for human rights violators, especially high-ranking state officials. 
Anti-impunity human rights prosecutions developed to strengthen human rights law as an 
attempt to remedy this. Sikkink writes: “Human rights prosecutions give teeth to the law because 
they can put formerly powerful people behind bars. If human rights law didn’t work because it 
lacked strength, this new form of enforcement should help improve compliance.”61 Sikkink uses 
a large dataset62 to convey her justice cascade and notes that “the rapid diffusion of [the justice 
cascade] follows almost immediately after the end of the Cold War and with the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1989-91,”63 corroborating Hoffmann’s argument. 
 In contemporary times, anti-impunity64 measures have become a principle tenet of most 
participating in human rights advocacy; however, this has not been met without criticism. Karen 
Engle expresses her concern with the human rights movement’s rapid shift towards criminal law 
— coinciding with the human rights wave of the 1990s — in her article, “Anti-Impunity and the 
Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights.” Engle argues that “the turn to criminal law was not an 
obvious trajectory for either the human rights movement or international law,” and that perhaps 
this embrace “has taken place with little systematic deliberation about the aims of criminal law or 
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about its pitfalls.”65 The conflation of anti-impunity with human rights advocacy is ultimately 
harmful, as many view the expression of opposition to anti-impunity measures to also mean an 
opposition to human rights.66 Not only have the two been densely intertwined, but the 
relationship between human rights and anti-impunity has “helped shape the direction of human 
rights advocacy as well as international human rights and international criminal law.”67 In 
addition to the significant amount of resources and time used by the ad hoc tribunals and the 
ICC, Engle worries that anti-impunity “provides a way for all sides [in conflict] to avoid overt 
discussion of distribution, even while deploying in their political struggles the criminal justice 
system, a potentially potent weapon of which the human rights movement has long been 
critical.”68 
 While Karen Engle’s concerns over the turn towards anti-impunity may be warranted to 
an extent, this project aims to analyze the contributions of the transnational women’s network to 
prosecuting sexual and gender based violence at the International Criminal Court, a process that 
is inevitably linked to the justice cascade. Although this process is not without its flaws, the 
inclusion of SGBV language in the Rome Statute is a net gain for the transnational women’s 
network. This project seeks to form a genealogy of the transnational women’s network and 
international criminal tribunals. Timing was essential to the involvement of the transnational 
women’s network in drafting the Rome Statute. I argue that in viewing the 1990s through the 
lens of both Hoffmann and Sikkink, it is possible to understand the phenomena of the human 
rights wave as the result of the confluence of three major world events. In the early to mid 1990s, 
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the transnational women’s network solidified its strength at UN conferences just as the idea for 
the International Criminal Court took off. The influence of transnational women’s networks at 
the ad hoc tribunals informed their approach to SBGV at Rome. I will engage with the specific 
changes in the language of the Rome Statute — and lack thereof — that can be traced back to 
the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice. Finally, Chapter 4 will examine cases before the ICC 
with regards to convictions and charges on the basis of SGBV crimes. By parsing through these 
three major, interconnected events I will attempt to convey one way that advocacy networks may 
affect issue-specific legal change, and whether or not this experience may be replicated.  
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Chapter 1: Mainstreaming Gender at the United Nations 
 
“If there is one message that echoes forth from this conference, let it be that human rights are 
women’s rights and women’s rights are human rights once and for all.” 
 - Hillary Rodham Clinton69 
 
 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink write in Activists beyond Borders that the 
contemporary usage of the word ‘network’ began with the women’s movement in the United 
States coining the phrase “old boy’s network.”70 This term originated from a critique of sexism, 
but women’s groups went on to build upon and use the word ‘network’ to describe their actions.71 
‘Woman’s network’ entered into popular use around 1975, the year of the First World 
Conference on Women in Mexico City, and experienced a peak in popularity in 1995, the period 
of time surrounding the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.72 At United Nations 
conferences, women’s networks manifested themselves as Women’s Caucuses formed by 
women’s rights NGOs. Women’s networks were initially limited in scope at Mexico City, but 
after twenty years, the transnational women’s network wielded considerable influence at 
conferences. The strategies developed by the women’s network influenced the way in which the 
Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice advocated for the inclusion of provisions on sexual and 
gender based violence at the Rome Conference in 1998. This chapter traces the development of 
the transnational women’s network at United Nations conferences, with specific regard to their 
campaign against Violence against Women. It is essential to this project to explore the 
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foundation of the transnational women’s network. Without the network’s adoption and eventual 
integration of VAW as a key issue to the United Nations, the WCGJ would have likely faced a 
steeper uphill battle in incorporating SGBV. The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice was a 
direct outgrowth of the Women’s Caucuses to be discussed in this chapter. The WCGJ website 
itself credits their formation to the highly organized work done at the UN that brought together 
women’s activists for Rome.73 
Violence against Women as an issue women’s advocacy networks fought against began 
relatively recently in organizing history. Prior to its emergence in the 1980s, the women’s 
movement primarily focused on discrimination. The original Convention for the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), drafted throughout the 1970s and 
adopted in 1979, does not make any reference to Violence against Women. In the early 1980s, 
Violence against Women became integrated into social justice discussions and rose to the 
forefront of United Nations activity in 1985. By the mid-1990s, Violence against Women had 
exploded into one of the most discussed international women’s issues, evidenced in its presence 
as a centerpiece of the Platform for Action at the United Nations Conference on Women in 
Beijing in 1995.74 At the same time, the UN Security Council established two ad hoc tribunals: 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), which included limited sexual and gender based violence 
crimes under their jurisdiction. This chapter will examine VAW and women’s organizing at 
United Nations conferences itself, as well as the organizational strategies utilized by the 
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transnational women’s network to mainstream gender into the final documents of the 
conferences. 
 
Discrimination and the Early Foundations of Violence against Women 
 Long before the United Nations existed, women’s organizing networks grew their roots 
in abolitionism of the 1800s and the international campaign for women’s suffrage.75 Although 
suffrage and abolition took place much earlier than the movement against VAW, Elisabeth 
Friedman argues in “Gendering the Agenda: The Impact of the Transnational Women’s Rights 
Movement at the UN Conferences of the 1990s” that both movements were defined by their 
relations with the international community. According to Friedman, “The suffrage movement … 
was bolstered by international meetings, and frequent travel and communications between 
activists helped the spread of ideas.”76 Women’s groups lobbied the League of Nations on issues 
of equality, and in 1928 the foundation of the Inter-American Commission on Women “was one 
of the groups instrumental in getting the provision on equal rights for women into the UN 
Charter, and recommending the formation of the UN Commission on the Status of Women.”77 
Twenty years later, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) took the Inter-American 
Commission’s advice into account and established the Commission on the Status of Women in 
1946.  
In “Transnational Networks on Violence against Women,” Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink identify the second wave of women’s organizing as beginning in the 1960s and early 
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1970s, concurrent with second wave feminism. Many women began organizing on international 
women’s rights after they experienced subordination to men in student, civil rights, liberation, 
and anti-authoritarian movements.78 In addition to establishing NGOs centered on women’s 
issues, women involved themselves in the United Nations. The Commission on the Status of 
Women (CSW) drafted the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(DEDAW).79 DEDAW’s eleven articles deal with issues of discrimination, including a woman’s 
right to vote,80 access to education,81 and generally abolishing existing discriminatory laws.82 
DEDAW served was the precursor to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which the CSW immediately began to draft after 
the adoption of DEDAW. CEDAW was successfully adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 
1981. Like DEDAW, this convention dealt with discriminatory practices against women, which 
was defined as “any exclusion or restriction on the basis of sex ... in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil, or any other field.”83 Both DEDAW and CEDAW refrained from 
referencing VAW. Between the 1960s and early 1970s, discrimination and equality were the 
focus of transnational women’s movements in the United States, Europe, and the United 
Nations system as a whole.84  
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The Transnational Women’s Network at UN Conferences (1975-1995) 
The influence of women’s groups in transnational politics greatly expanded between the 
early 1970s and mid-1980s. After lobbying by the Women’s International Democratic 
Federation and others, the CSW recommended that the UN General Assembly declare 1975 the 
International Women’s Year. This made way for the First World Conference on Women to be 
held in Mexico City, as well as the subsequent declaration of 1976-1985 as the UN Decade for 
Women.85 The UN Decade for Women established two conferences dedicated entirely to 
women’s issues: the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women in Copenhagen (1980) 
and the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the UN Decade for 
Women in Nairobi (1985). Women’s groups had a considerable impact on the agenda of both 
gender-centric conferences and other issue-based conferences.  
 
The First World Conference on Women: Mexico City (1975) 
The Mexico City Conference86 was fundamental to the development of the international 
women’s movement as the first UN conference solely dedicated to women. The participation of 
NGOs — that will prove to be pivotal in their advocacy — was very limited, “with only two 
representatives per accredited NGO permitted to participate on a limited basis.”87 Despite the 
restrictions on the capabilities of NGOs, Mexico City was fertile ground for activists to form 
strong networks. One such network, the International Women’s Tribune Centre (IWTC), was 
established during the conference. After the conference concluded, the IWTC used their mailing 
list to increase accessibility to information and advocacy tools. In 1998, this mailing list grew to 
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16,000 individuals and groups representing women from 160 countries.88 “Mexico City focused 
on some of the fundamental issues … but it also did something that, while less tangible, may be 
in some ways more important than anything else: It established a network,”89 Lucille Mair, the 
Secretary General of the Copenhagen Conference, reflected. In addition to establishing the 
beginnings of a strong, effective network of women’s rights activists, Keck and Sikkink identify 
the streamlining of CEDAW’s ratification as a major success of Mexico City.  
Around the time of Mexico City, the first domestic violence shelters opened in London 
and the United States (in 1971 and 1974, respectively), and discussion of domestic violence as a 
serious international issue began in Fran Hosken’s Women’s International Network (WIN) 
News in 1975. When Mexico City occurred, domestic violence was still too new to become a 
center point of the conference. Shortly after, the March 1976 First International Tribune on 
Crimes against Women was held in Brussels, where “two thousand women from forty countries 
spoke out on family violence, wife beating, rape, prostitution, female genital mutilation, murder 
of women, and persecution of lesbians.”90 While the World Plan of Action adopted at Mexico 
City failed to explicitly discuss violence, the initial networks formed at the conference would 
prove to be essential in furthering the campaign against VAW. 
 
The World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Copenhagen (1980) 
Keck and Sikkink trace the origins of the international network on Violence against 
Women to a series of meetings at the UN Women’s Conference in Copenhagen in 1980.91 
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Charlotte Bunch, an organizer for a set of panels on international feminist networking at the 
NGO forum held in conjunction with Copenhagen reflects: 
We observed that in two weeks of the forum that the workshops on issues related 
to sexual violence against women were the most successful … they were 
workshops where women did not divide along north-south lines, that women felt 
a sense of commonality and energy in the room … you get a chance to deal with 
difference, and see culture, and race, and class, subordinated and subjected to this 
violence everywhere, and that nobody has the answers. So northern women 
couldn’t dominate and say we know how to do this, because the northern women 
were saying: “our country is a mess; we have a very violent society.” So it created a 
complete different ground for conversation... It wasn’t that we built the network 
in that moment. It was just the sense of that possibility.92 
This newfound sense of possibility on an issue that seemed to cross the north/south divide 
culminated in the first explicit mention of domestic and sexual violence in an official United 
Nations document. The Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for 
Women: Equality, Development and Peace makes mentions to ‘domestic and sexual violence 
against women’ in the Legislative Measures section. This section states: “Legislation should also 
be enacted and implemented in order to prevent domestic and sexual Violence against Women. 
All appropriate measures, including legislative ones, should be taken to allow victims to be fairly 
treated in all criminal procedures.”93 The document calls for the ratification and implementation 
of CEDAW, the protection of women’s political rights worldwide, decries discrimination, and 
denounces the gendered effects of apartheid.94 Similar to the case of Mexico City, after the 
conference in Copenhagen concluded, there was a surge of organizing around VAW. One of the 
first occurrences of this was in 1981, where participants at the first Feminist Encounter for Latin 
America and Caribbean proposed to honor the anniversary of three sisters murdered by the 
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Trujillo dictatorship by holding the “Day against Violence against Women” on November 
25th.95 Following suit, a coalition of Latin American women’s organizations held similar 
commemorations that contributed to the international campaign, “16 Days of Activism against 
Gender Violence.” This campaign, originating from groups in the global south, is now an annual 
event practiced internationally by NGOs and UN Women.96 
 
The Third World Conference on Women: Nairobi (1985) 
 After ten years of development, Violence against Women was finally on the agenda for 
the 1985 Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi. Following the trend of Mexico City 
and Copenhagen, Nairobi attracted an increased number of women, with 14,000 women from 
150 countries attending Nairobi’s NGO forum.97 There, activists formed the International 
Network against Violence against Women (INAVAW), a network of communication, and the 
International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW), a group established to monitor 
CEDAW. By the time of Nairobi, Elisabeth Friedman writes: 
Advances in gender-based critiques of development theory and practice showed 
how women’s oppression can only be understood contextually, by taking into 
account women and men’s positions within specific countries, cultures, and 
economies. From a focus on identifying oppression (and fighting over its various 
forms), women moved to strategizing over ways to confront its various 
manifestations, whatever their original causes.98 
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From Nairobi, governments adopted the Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of 
Women.99 The Forward-Looking Strategies was integral in linking peace to the elimination of 
Violence against Women in both the public and the private sphere,100 with eight paragraphs 
specifically addressing VAW. This general consensus on framing by the time of Nairobi served 
as an important stepping-stone for the emergence of networks in the transnational women’s 
movement.101 These networks include IWRAW, the Latin American Committee for Defense of 
Women’s Rights (CLADEM), the Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development 
(APWLD), and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF).  
 After Nairobi, the transnational women’s network set off an unprecedented chain of 
United Nations action related to VAW. Months after Nairobi, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution addressing domestic violence for the first time at the behest of a CSW 
recommendation to ECOSOC.102 Although the language in Resolution 4036 airs on the side of 
gender neutral, the writers cite Resolution 9 adopted by the Sixth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which “called for the fair treatment of 
women by criminal justice system”103 and the recommendations made in Nairobi. The 
implementation of Resolution 4036 required an Expert Group Meeting on Violence in the 
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Family, which put an emphasis on women and stipulated that “domestic violence as a global 
phenomenon which was significantly underreported.”104  
 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio (1992) 
 The strong presence of women at UN conferences was not limited to those emerging 
from the UN Decade for Women. In 1992, the Conference on Environment and Development 
was held in Rio, where women’s groups maintained a definitive presence. The women’s tent at 
the NGO forum, Planeta Femea, was the largest venue at the conference and attracted 1,500 
people. Women’s activists linked women’s rights to environmental preservation and 
sustainability. Activists employed new tactics to advocate for the inclusion of issues targeting 
women in the initially genderless final document of the conference, Agenda 21. The Women’s 
Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), started by Bella Abzug, a United States 
activist and politician, sponsored the World Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet. When 
faced with a lack of inclusion, women’s groups “creat[ed] their own opportunities for 
mobilization around the more general opportunity of the conference [and] organized the largest-
ever NGO preparatory conference for a UN meeting, with 1,500 participants.”105 Women 
utilized the format of a “tribunal to offer public testimony about women’s connection to 
environmental issues”106 for the first time. Friedman notes that WEDO developed the 
‘insider/outsider’ strategy of advocacy, which became standard throughout the 1990s. This 
approach “simultaneously mobiliz[ed] advocacy networks to bring pressure from outside 
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governmental arenas and coordinat[ed] lobbying inside them.”107 The establishment of the 
Women’s Caucus, a group that lobbied for gender issues throughout the conference, was one of 
the most important contributions to the transnational women’s network. To be clear, the 
Women’s Caucus referred to here was not the same Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice that 
developed in Rome, but the concept of a Women’s Caucus itself was a pivotal development. 
Friedman identifies ‘precedent setting’ as a key strategy of the Caucus.108 When lobbying 
delegates to include women’s rights in Agenda 21, members of the Caucus assembled ‘precedent 
setting’ information from previous UN resolutions and documents that supported the Caucus’ 
positions, thus conveying that their positions were “built on accepted norms within the UN, not 
new rights.”109 This tactic, according to Friedman, “was a clear effort to mainstream the women’s 
rights message while countering objections to it.”110 WEDO and the Women’s Caucus’ efforts 
were evidentially a success: the draft Agenda 21 contained two references to women, but by the 
conclusion of Rio an entire chapter, “Global Action for Women Towards Sustainable and 
Equitable Development,” was added with 172 references to women. VAW was not a subject of 
focus at Rio, but the tactics developed by activists there permeated conferences in which VAW 
became a central issue and depicts the affect that the transnational women’s network can have on 
conference delegates. 
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The World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna (1993) 
 The next year, the World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna, and women 
made up half of the 3,000 NGO participants.111 Women’s groups prepared meticulously for 
Vienna using national data generation, media contacts, and governmental lobbying through the 
coordination of northern NGOs, including the Center for Women’s Global Leadership 
(CWGL), International Women’s Tribune Center (IWTC), and International Women’s Rights 
Action Watch (IWRAW). Keck and Sikkink accurately convey the strong role women’s groups 
played at Vienna, citing them as an example of “a network’s ability to draw attention to issues, set 
agendas, and influence the discursive positions of both states and international organizations.”112 
Friedman argues that despite northern NGOs taking the lead on organizing, “leaders worked 
closely with international advocates to insure the representativeness of the movement and its 
message.”113 Charlotte Bunch, the founder of the CWGL, emerged as a leading advocate for the 
inclusion of VAW in the conference. Similar to the Women’s Caucus of Rio, the Global 
Campaign for Women’s Human Rights was created to unite 90 NGOs in making the 
international community focus on VAW in Vienna.114 In addition to the CWGL, the Women’s 
Caucus from Rio reemerged as a key organizer at Vienna.  
 Leading up to Vienna, the CWGL worked with organizations to globally launch the 
previously discussed ‘16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence’ campaign in 1991. The 
CWGL spearheaded an effective petitioning campaign calling for women’s rights to be 
recognized as human rights. The petition was sponsored by 800 groups and garnered 300,000 
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signatures from 123 countries by the beginning of the conference.115 At the same time, the UN 
chose to officially recognize ‘satellite meetings’ “by holding several international gatherings that 
issued statements and reports included in the official documentation of the conference.”116 In 
addition to attending satellite meetings, the CWGL directly engaged with governments in the 
preparatory process in order to guarantee the inclusion of ‘women’s human rights’ language in 
Vienna. The extraordinary engagement efforts undertaken by the CWGL — both at the UN 
and with governments directly — allowed them to have a direct impact on the language of the 
final document in Vienna. The Women’s Caucus coordinated lobbying efforts, uniting upwards 
of 200 participants, and made six plenary presentations at the governmental conference to 
present the demands of women’s human rights advocates.117 
The CWGL found an ally within the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 
via Roxanna Carillo, former CWGL staff member and the then head of UNIFEM’s women’s 
rights program, using the insider/outsider tactic of Rio. Carillo and the CWGL regularly met 
throughout Vienna, ensuring contact between NGOs and delegates.118 Again reflecting Rio, the 
CWGL made use of the Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet’s tribunal strategy. The 
CWGL designed the Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Human Rights, which featured 
testimonies of women from all regions of the world, to showcase the daily, widespread abuse of 
women’s rights.119 The Tribunal was featured in Vienna’s NGO Forum, where women delivered 
“personal testimony of devastating human rights abuses to a distinguished panel of judges. 
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Hundreds of spectators observed the day-long Tribunal and its conclusions were presented as 
part of the official record of the governmental conferences.”120  
Despite the effort of the Tribunal to represent women globally, the diverse group of 
women also displayed numerous tensions apparent in trying to unify the abuses experienced by 
women in one coherent ‘frame’. At the Tribunal, women suggested that their abuse was caused 
by a variety of factors: “sexism, religious belief, and poverty — and blamed a range of actors, 
from husbands to state agents to the structure of global capitalism.”121 Within the NGO 
workshops themselves, fierce debates broke out over the role that legal recourse as a whole should 
play in the women’s rights movement, and if the State should even play a role in the protection 
of women.122 Vienna exposed the weaknesses of the women’s rights network; however, 
organizers still exercised considerable influence over the negotiations. 
The work of the CWGL and the Women’s Caucus succeeded in mainstreaming women’s 
human rights into the Vienna Conference. Mentions of women’s human rights cropped up all 
over the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action as a result of a concentrated effort with 
organizing from both inside and outside government. The language of Section 1, Paragraph 18 
recalls the ‘women’s rights are human rights’ mantra of the conference, while explicitly discussing 
gender-based sexual violence:  
The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and 
indivisible part of universal human rights … Gender-based violence and all forms 
of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting from cultural 
prejudice and international trafficking, are incompatible with the dignity and 
worth of the human person, and must be eliminated. This can be achieved by 
legal measures and through national action and international cooperation in such 
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fields as economic and social development, education, safe maternity and health 
care, and social support.123 
Section 1, Paragraph 28 addresses the World Conference’s dismay at massive human rights 
violations, including the “systematic rape of women in war situations,” and links systematic rape 
directly to refugees and displacement.124 Similarly, Paragraph 29 of the same section expresses 
the Conference’s concern over “violations of human rights during armed conflicts, affecting the 
civilian population, especially women.”125 The third section of this document addresses “the 
equal status and human rights of women” in nine thorough paragraphs. This section focuses on 
discrimination issues, but condemns SGBV: “All violations of this kind, including in particular 
murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective 
response.”126 The gender-related progress made in Rio the year prior are affirmed and the need 
for women’s human rights are emphasized as a central focus of Beijing in 1995. Gender 
mainstreaming at Vienna would not have been possible without the strong network of women’s 
advocates at UN conferences that had been in development since Mexico City.  
 
The International Conference on Population and Development: Cairo (1994) 
 Women’s rights advocates convened the following year at the International Conference 
on Population and Development. Similar to their involvement in Rio and Vienna, activists were 
able to exert influence on the conference in a way that framed the agenda to include issues 
central to women. This time, advocates successfully linked controlling population growth to 
reproductive health access. Friedman argues that these activists “were responsible for the switch 
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from a framing of population issues as focused on controlling population growth to inextricably 
tied to the promotion of women’s rights, both reproductive and other.”127 Like in Rio and 
Vienna, women’s NGOs quickly formed a Women’s Caucus prior to government preparatory 
processes to get women’s rights issues on the conference’s agenda.128 In 1992, advocates formed 
the Women’s Voices ‘94 Alliance and produced “Women’s Declaration on Population Policies.” 
The International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC) circulated the statement and collected 
signatures from over 2,200 individuals and organizations spanning 100 countries.129 The IWHC 
also held the “Declaration of the Reproductive Health” conference in January of 1994, nine 
months before Cairo, attracting 215 women from 79 countries for an NGO version of the 
governmental preparatory committee.130  
 At Cairo itself, the level of involvement that the Secretary General allowed NGOs to 
have grew substantially. Not only were “NGOs [allowed] to attend even informal consultations, 
but [the Secretary General] also gave them leave to intervene during closed door sessions … 
[and] incorporated their written statements in draft governmental documents.”131 In addition to 
attending the conference separately, NGOs were often a component of governmental 
delegations. Half of the United States’ delegates were leaders on women’s health issues, for 
example.132 The Women’s Caucus formed at Cairo was the largest yet, with an estimated 400 to 
500 women attending their meetings (compared to the ‘Pro-Life’ Caucus, which attracted fifteen 
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members).133 The result of the transnational women’s network’s work was the emergence of 
language in the final document addressing women in relation to population growth. The fourth 
of fifteen principles outlining the final document reads: “Advancing gender equality and equity 
and the empowerment of women, and the elimination of all kinds of violence against women, 
and ensuring women’s ability to control their own fertility, and are cornerstones of population 
and development related programs.”134 The fourth chapter of the report is dedicated to the 
“Gender Equality, Equity, and Empowerment of Women,” where VAW is explicitly discussed 
eight times. During conference presentations, “nearly every delegation head mentioned the role 
of women, women’s empowerment, women’s education, and women’s rights as central to the 
purpose at hand.”135 Like its predecessors at Rio and Vienna, organizers at Cairo fundamentally 
impacted the agenda at a conference on population and development to include provisions on 
women’s rights and Violence against Women.  
 
The Fourth World Conference on Women: Beijing (1995) 
 In September of 1995, the United Nations convened the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, attracting an unprecedented 17,000 participants and 30,000 activists.136 Marking 
twenty years since Mexico City, Beijing highlighted the rapid growth experienced by the 
international women’s rights movement. Where domestic violence was still too new to breach 
Mexico City’s agenda, delegates found themselves in intense debate over a wide range of 
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subjects, including VAW. Hilary Charlesworth argues that the continued attempts of ‘gendering 
the agenda’ at United Nations conferences had an effect at Beijing: “it was clear that the term 
‘gender mainstreaming’ had achieved great popularity. It appeared throughout the lengthy 
Platform for Action as a strategy to redress women’s unequal position in twelve areas of 
concern.”137 Despite the perceived mainstreaming of gender at Beijing, the conference itself also 
experienced an unprecedented amount of disagreement amongst delegations in comparison to 
the first three World Conferences on Women. Martha Alter Chen, writing at the end of the 
final Preparatory Committee, notes that “on the eve of the Fourth World Conference … there 
were signs of a well-organised and well-financed backlash”138 against the promises made at Rio, 
Vienna, and Cairo. Chen traces these challenges back to the PrepComs held prior to Beijing. 
NGOs faced increased accessibility restrictions, and on the inside, the drafting process was 
cumbersome and inefficient. After the final PrepCom, 35% of the Draft Platform of Action 
contained square brackets, each marking a point that at least one government was unwilling to 
accept and indicated that further negotiations and amendments would occur in Beijing.139 
Furthermore, the Draft Platform was introduced late into the final PrepCom and left little time 
for delegations to develop positions on the language of the text. “The preparatory process itself 
[was] sufficiently participatory that minority voices [could] slow down, derail, or obstruct the 
process.”140 In an interview, Dorothy Thomas expressed “that such disagreement illustrated how 
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fragile the global consensus around women’s human rights was going into the Beijing 
meeting.”141 
 Although Beijing was ramping up to be the most contentious women’s conference, the 
transnational women’s movement had also developed effective lobbying strategies and organized 
far beyond what it was in Mexico City. Women’s NGOs carefully monitored bracketed issues 
and recommended language to governmental delegations. At times, “government delegations 
incorporated language suggested by NGOs directly; [at other times] governments consulted with 
NGOs to shape their positions on issues.”142 Elisabeth Friedman rightly asserts that the ultimate 
goal of the transnational women’s movement at Beijing was not primarily one of mainstreaming 
gender, but one of “protect[ing] the gains made against the newly powerful countermovement 
[against their agenda], while trying to ensure some implementation for the new frames of the 
1990s.”143 This countermovement identified by Friedman has been described as the ‘Unholy 
Alliance,’ a coalition of countries with strong Catholic and Islamic leadership. This voting bloc 
emerged after the increased visibility of women’s groups at Vienna and came out in full force at 
Cairo over issues of abortion. At Beijing, WEDO coordinated a “Linkage Caucus” in an attempt 
to preserve the progress made by women’s groups. The Linkage Caucus created three advocacy 
documents: “recommendations on bracketed language; a chart of precedents from other UN 
documents and conferences legitimating specific NGO demands; and a Pledge for Gender 
Justice.”144 Due to the limited access that NGOs had to governmental working groups 
negotiating the bracketed language, the lobbying of governmental representatives occurred rather 
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informally at coffee breaks and in hallways.145 Established relationships between advocates and 
delegates is key to maintaining lines of communication, especially when access to the 
governmental conference is limited. Without NGO collaboration with certain governments, it 
likely would have been difficult for activists to preserve the gains made in earlier conferences. 
 The Platform for Action at Beijing, despite previous advances, was the most contested 
text of all statements from international conferences.146 Similar to Rome, the two key issues that 
were heavily disputed at Beijing were the use of the word gender (as opposed to sex) and 
perceived ‘threats’ to the family. Catholic states led by the Holy See “objected to the feminist use 
of the word [gender], which distinguishes between biological sex and the roles, expectations, and 
actions of socialized men and women.”147 The progressive use of gender, according to many 
delegations from predominantly Catholic countries, opened the floodgates to alternate 
definitions of gender identity that operate outside of the man/woman dichotomy. Twenty 
countries held reservations on paragraphs of the Platform for Action that were deemed to be 
incompatible with Islamic law, including issues of “reproductive rights/abortion, homosexuality, 
and inheritance.”148 Six Catholic Latin American countries and Malta expressed similar 
reservations on components of the Platform that challenged the ‘traditional’ nuclear family, 
heterosexuality, and abortion bans.149 Like at Cairo, Catholic and Islamic countries formed blocs 
on these issues that would persist after the conclusion of Beijing at the Rome Conference. 
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 Most feminist issues were preserved, and some even experienced advancement, despite 
the threat presented by numerous states to the advances made by the women’s network in prior 
conferences. In regards to the usage of the term ‘gender,’ Annex IV to the Platform for Action 
specified, “the word ‘gender’ as used in the Platform for Action was intended to be interpreted 
and understood as it was in ordinary, generally accepted usage.”150 This vague statement on 
gender seems to replace the disputed definition in the draft Platform, but allows for some level of 
interpretation. The final Platform for Action made notable advancements in the areas of sexual 
and reproductive health, anti-choice abortion laws, rape as a war crime, and the rights of girls. 
Paragraph 96 of the Platform includes “right to have control over and decide freely and 
responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of 
coercion, discrimination and violence” as a human right of women.151 Paragraph 106(k) 
addresses reproductive rights and urges governments to “consider reviewing laws containing 
punitive measures against women who have undergone illegal abortions.”152 Section E, “Women 
in Armed Conflict,” discusses sexual and gender based violence in depth. Paragraph 132 declares 
that “rape, including systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy require a particularly 
effective response,”153 while Paragraph 135 states:  
The impact of Violence against Women and violation of the human rights of 
women in such situations is experienced by women of all ages … who are victims 
of acts of murder, terrorism, torture, involuntary disappearance, sexual slavery, 
rape, sexual abuse and forced pregnancy in situations of armed conflict, especially 
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as a result of policies of ethnic cleansing and other new and emerging forms of 
violence.154 
Likewise, Paragraph 132 deems rape, which includes systematic rape in war, a “massive 
violations of human rights … are abhorrent practices that are strongly condemned and must be 
stopped immediately, while perpetrators of such crimes must be punished.”155 The Platform links 
SGBV in conflict to the importance of equity in the peace process, and suggests “increas[ing] the 
participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels”156 as a means to 
alleviating this phenomenon. WEDO claims that in sum, 67% of recommendations made by 
NGOs on the bracketed text were incorporated into the final Platform for Action.157 
 
Conclusion 
 In the span of twenty years, the transnational women’s network managed to influence the 
United Nations far beyond the scope of the World Conferences on Women. Beginning in the 
late 1970s, the Mexico City Conference and CEDAW made no reference to Violence against 
Women but by Beijing in 1995, VAW rose to become a centerpiece of the final document. 
Mainstreaming VAW to be a key component of the policy agendas of international 
organizations would have simply been impossible without the transnational women’s network 
between 1975 and 1995. The success of the women’s network in ‘gendering the agenda’ at non-
women centric conferences158 was due to their tactical frontline. By Beijing, the use of these 
strategies — specialized women’s networks, extensive preparatory work, precedent setting, the 
Tribunal model, and the insider/outsider strategy — were solidified in the women’s network's 
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repertoire. As Friedman notes, the advancement of mainstreaming tactics also emboldened their 
opposition to respond similarly, entering into a framing contest. At the same time as the 
conferences of the early 1990s, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda were established and shaped by the outcome of these conferences. Tracking the 
development of women’s networks and strategies at UN conferences is vital to understanding the 
role of the WCGJ at the Rome Conference in 1998, which I argue is a direct outgrowth of the 
transnational women’s networks of the UN.  
 
 
  
 
 
49 
Chapter 2: Sexual and Gender Based Violence Under International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
''Rape was considered a kind of collateral damage. It was seen as part of the unpreventable, 
fundamental culture of war.'' 
-Rhonda Copelon159 
 
This chapter will delve into a thick description of the development of the justice cascade 
that flourished in the early 1990s with the ad hoc tribunals. The culmination of this chapter will 
be an analysis of landmark ad hoc cases that deeply impacted the ways in which the International 
Criminal Court has prosecuted SGBV crimes. The formation of the ad hoc tribunals, riding the 
human rights wave of the 1990s, was one of the key contributing factors to the successful 
construction of the ICC. The deep history of tribunal formation must be parsed out in order to 
understand both the WCGJ’s incorporation of SGBV crimes and the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court itself. The rapid development of international criminal tribunals in 
the 1990s  — both the ad hoc courts and the ICC — is exemplary of Kathryn Sikkink’s justice 
cascade and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann’s temporal postulation of the rise of human rights 
idealism, both of which I argue were key to the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice’s existence.  
 
Rape and the Laws of War: From Richard II to Abraham Lincoln 
As early as 500 BC, informal laws of war existed to regulate wartime behavior;160 
however, rape and sexual violence against women and girls were long considered to be property 
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crimes against the man that owned her. Oftentimes in conflict, rape was legitimate within the 
laws of war.161 The Middle Ages saw a continuation of the normative belief in the admissibility 
of rape as a spoil of war, but both Richard II162 and Henry V163 introduced bans on wartime rape 
in 1385 and 1419, respectively. Beginning in at the end of the Middle Ages, the legitimacy of 
the wartime practice of rape began to be rethought by jurists and philosophers. Lucas de Penna, 
a Neapolitan jurist and judge writing in the fourteenth century, advocated for the protection of 
noncombatants from crimes, including rape.164 Alberico Gentili, another noteworthy Italian 
jurist, echoed de Penna’s views in the fifteenth century.165 Gerrard Winstanley, a fifteenth 
century English political philosopher and founder of the Diggers,166 advocated for rapists to face 
capital punishment.167 Winstanley locates the equality of men and women in the ability of all 
genders to reason,168 a radically progressive belief for his time.169 Hugo Grotius’ The Law of 
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War and Peace, the first comprehensive systemization of the international laws of war in the 
seventeenth century, eschewed the practice of rape in war.170 Obviously, the opposition of 
wartime rape by a handful of philosophers and rulers did very little to prevent wartime rape, and 
impunity for such crimes has prevailed for the majority of human history. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries began to include vague, though vital, provisions 
addressing wartime sexual violence against women and girls. The Lieber Codes (1863) was the 
first attempt to codify international customary laws of land warfare by Columbia College 
Professor Francis Lieber during the American Civil War. These codes, signed into law by 
President Lincoln, were specific instructions to regulate the conduct of Union soldiers made 
explicit reference to sexual violence in Article 44, which “prohibited rape as a capital crime.“171 
The Code stated, “All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country … all 
rape … [is] prohibited under the penalty of death, or other such severe punishment as may seem 
adequate for the gravity of the offense.”172 Aspects of the Lieber Code became the basis for The 
Law and Customs of War On Land (Hague Convention IV).  
The Hague Convention’s adaptation of Article 44 underwent serious changes, dropping 
the explicit reference to rape. Instead, Article 46 of the Hague Convention reads: “Family 
honour and rights, the lives of all persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions 
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and practice, must be respected.”173 Article 46 may be interpreted to include rape under the 
provision of family honor and rights, however “in practice it has seldom been so interpreted.”174 
It is important to note the absorption of sexual and gender based violence as subsidiary under the 
category of family and honor rights, as the reliance on language that emphasizes ‘purity’ and 
‘morality’ over the gravity of SGBV itself became pervasive later legislation, including the 
Geneva Conventions. Moving into the twentieth century, Article 46 of the Hague Conventions 
laid a rocky foundation for prosecuting sexual and gender based violence and allowed for 
impunity to persist throughout much of the century.  
 
The Post-War Landscape: The IMT, IMTFE, and the Geneva Conventions 
 The atrocities of the First and Second World Wars ushered in the prosecution human 
rights abuses through international tribunals. In response to the atrocities of the Second World 
War, the Allied Powers began to explore the possibility of prosecuting the Axis Powers in 
October of 1941.175 Nearly two years later, on October 20, 1943, the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (UNWCC) was formed in London. Ten days later, the Allied Powers 
issued the Moscow Declaration stating that the Allied Powers’ “united action, pledged for the 
prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization 
and maintenance of peace and security.”176 The Allied Powers created the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT), commonly known as the Nuremberg Trials, on August 8, 1945 to prosecute 
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prominent members of Nazi Germany. Four signatories — the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland, the Provisional French Government, and the Soviet Union — 
established the IMT, with four members, one representing each signatory.177  
The IMT’s jurisdiction extended to three principal crimes: crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. Crimes against peace was defined by the Charter as 
“namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation 
of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”178 Where crimes against peace relate 
to the waging of a war itself, both war crimes and crimes against humanity refer to the treatment 
of individuals. The Charter classifies war crimes as violations of customs or laws of war, and 
clearly lists out a number of actions that are considered war crimes:  
Murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners 
of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity.179 
Crimes relating to sexual and gender based violence are absent, despite their prevalence 
throughout the Second World War. Similarly, the Charter defines crimes against humanity as a 
number of acts committed against a civilian population, without the condition of ongoing war: 
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population ... or persecutions on political, racial or 
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religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.180 
The Charter leaves room for the inclusion of ‘other inhumane acts’, but SGBV is absent from the 
listed crimes and the categories of persecuted groups. In comparison to the Lieber Codes that 
preceded the IMT by over eighty years, the Charter did very little at all to incorporate SGBV 
crimes. Due to the Hague Conventions’ influence upon the Charter’s definition of war crimes, it 
is unsurprising that SGBV was overlooked at this point in history.  
 Prosecutions began in Berlin on October 18, 1945 against twenty-four high-ranking 
officials of the Nazi regime and seven organizations. The IMT itself was groundbreaking: it was 
the first tribunal of its kind to prosecute serious crimes under international law. This was the first 
time that high ranking representatives of states were prosecuted, which “made it impossible to 
pass responsibility along to the ‘state’; immunity in one’s capacity as an officer of the state was no 
longer a reason for exemption from punishment.”181 The ultimate goal of the IMT was to 
prosecute crimes using international law in an international tribunal in order to “expand law into 
an effective, reliable legal system functioning on the basis of proceedings under the rule of 
law.”182 At the trial’s conclusion, all but three men were found guilty and twelve of these twenty-
one were sentenced to death. Not one of these convictions charged SGBV as a war crime under 
customary international law.  
 The International Military Tribunal did not make mention to sexual and gender based 
violence in either its Charter or the charges brought to the perpetrators, but room for 
prosecuting the Third Reich for SGBV crimes was created in Control Council Law No. 10 
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(1945). Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL No. 10) can reasonably be likened to the IMT 
Charter, but for Germany’s national courts for crimes under international law. On December 20, 
1945, Control Council Law No. 10 was issued and extended the work of the IMT. Article 
2(1)(d), CCL No. 10 criminalized “membership in categories of a criminal group or organization 
declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal”183 and incorporated the prohibition of 
allowing immunity for heads of state from prosecution in Article 7 of the IMT. CCL No. 10 
continued to prosecute crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the 
definitions of crimes against peace and war crimes remained mostly unchanged, CCL No. 10’s 
definition of crimes against humanity evolved substantially: it included rape. Aside from this, the 
explicit list of actions considered to be a crime against humanity remained virtually the same:  
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, 
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of 
the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.184 
This listing of rape set a definite milestone for re-introducing SGBV as an explicit crime against 
humanity under IHL/ICL. Few perpetrators, if any at all, of the 15,000 proceedings conducted 
before national courts under CCL No. 10 were charged with rape as a crime against humanity.  
 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), the IMT’s Pacific 
Theater counterpart, was founded by the Allied Powers in a special proclamation on January 19, 
1946. The IMTFE was established by a special proclamation from General Douglas MacArthur, 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Pacific, who retained a significant 
amount of power over the court’s proceedings. Differing from the IMT, the judges of the 
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IMTFE were a mix of judges from the Allied and Pacific Theater nations. General MacArthur 
appointed twelve judges, nine of which were from countries that signed the Japanese Instrument 
of Surrender.185 Some doubts were expressed as to the partiality of MacArthur’s appointees: the 
Philippine judge had survived a massacre by Imperial Japan and the Australian President of the 
tribunal previously prepared a report for his government on Japanese war crimes.186 Sparing the 
Indian judge, none of the appointees were experienced in international law, and the Soviet and 
French judges did not speak either English or Japanese and required a translator.187 
 Like the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, the IMTFE prosecuted three 
crimes: crimes against peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The 
IMTFE’s definitions of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity are very similar to the 
original IMT definitions — not the CCL No. 10’s with the inclusion of rape. Where the IMT’s 
definition for conventional war crimes spanned numerous specific acts, the IMTFE’s definition 
simply reads, “namely, the violations of the laws or customs of war.”188 Perpetrators were charged 
with SGBV under this category of crimes. The IMTFE found “some Japanese military and 
civilian officials guilty of war crimes, including rape, because they failed to carry out their duty to 
ensure their subordinates complied with international law.”189 Admiral Toyoda of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy was charged with violating the laws and customs of war by tolerating abuses made 
by his subordinates, including rape.190 The IMTFE did not call any of the women who were 
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raped to testify.191 Toyoda was acquitted of all charges. The IMTFE only dedicated a mere 
paragraph in a judgment to the SGBV crimes that occurred during the Nanking Massacre192 
Equally troubling, the widespread “notorious forcing of thousands of ‘comfort women’ into 
prostitution in Japanese military brothels was … ignored by the IMTFE.”193 The IMTFE did 
make notable progress from its counterpart in Nuremberg by explicitly listing rape as a crime 
against humanity and prosecuting it as such, but the IMTFE fell short in its approach towards 
prosecuting SGBV. Despite these shortcomings, the explicit presence of SGBV in the charges of 
war crimes sowed a seed for future normative development.  
 The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols were adopted in the wake of the 
Second World War in an attempt to further limit war crimes in future conflicts. The four 
Geneva Conventions, all adopted in 1949, cover four distinct groups of people. The first three 
concern themselves with soldiers: wounded and sick soldiers on land, wounded and sick soldiers 
at sea, and prisoners of war. The Fourth Geneva Convention discusses the protection of civilians, 
including those in occupied territories. All four Geneva Conventions share amongst themselves a 
Common Article Three, which importantly includes non-international armed conflict situations 
in its jurisdiction.  
 The Fourth Geneva Convention and Common Article Three make progress in 
international law addressing sexual and gender based violence. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention directly forbids SGBV: “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on 
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their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”194 
The First and Second Additional Protocols dedicate room to SGBV in international and non-
international armed conflicts. Protocol I includes an entire article on the treatment of women, 
regarding women as “the object of special respect,”195 with subclauses two and three making 
reference to pregnant women or women with young children. These two subclauses give priority 
to pregnant women and mothers with dependent infants on detainment case processing and 
urges member states to avoid enforcing capital punishment on such women. Article 76 of 
Protocol I reiterates Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention outlawing SGBV. Protocol II 
lists “outrages against personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, 
enforced prostitution, or any other form of indecent assault,”196 as “prohibited in any time or 
place whatsoever.”197 Despite the inclusion of rape and other forms of SGBV throughout the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, SGBV crimes are not listed amongst the grave 
breaches subject to universal jurisdiction.  
 It is important to note the language that encompasses the provisions in the Geneva 
Conventions relating to women and its reliance on notions of honor and outrages upon personal 
dignity. The linkage of sexual and gender based violence to a woman’s honor is very problematic 
for the activists at both the ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Conference. The crimes enumerated 
in the Geneva Conventions established a hierarchy of crimes, with grave breaches at the top 
benefiting from universal jurisdiction and all other crimes following, including every SGBV 
                                                
194 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949. Article 27. 
195 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3, Article 76(1). 
196 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 
1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Article 4(2)(e). 
197 Ibid. Article 4(2).  
 
 
59 
crime. The lack of incorporation of sexual and gender based violence as a grave breach and the 
focus on honor provisions in one of the most influential IHL documents proved to be a burden 
for women’s activists working on the ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute. At Rome, feminist 
activists were in complete agreement over opposing the use of ‘honor’ in the Rome Statute.198 
Linking honor to SGBV crimes unnecessarily places an undue focus on the degradation of honor 
and distances the violent crime from the perpetrator.  
 
The Second Wind: The Ad Hoc  Tribunals 
 The stretch of decades following the post-war period, which produced the International 
Military Tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and the Geneva 
Conventions in the span of four years, remained silent on the front of international tribunals 
until the 1990s. For the majority of the twentieth century, the laws of war overlooked sexual and 
gender based violence. Richard Goldstone and Estelle Dehon write in their “Engendering 
Accountability: Gender Crimes Under International Law” on the nature of this phenomenon: 
It is not really surprising, given that these laws were written by men drawing 
heavily on the male chivalristic tradition and were interpreted by male military 
lawyers, judges, and governmental experts, in an age when rape was placed on the 
same footing as plundering, and was considered to be an inevitable consequence 
of war.199 
The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda represent a shift 
away from this line of thought. The ad hoc tribunals have been characterized as having a 
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“specific intent to prosecute perpetrators of sexual assaults.”200 These tribunals differ greatly from 
the military tribunals of the 1940s that for the most part overlooked the clear existence of sexual 
and gender based violence.  
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established 
in 1993 as a response to the conflicts in the Balkans resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
On May 25, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 827 and formally created the ICTY. 
Resolution 827 invoked the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers in order to create a tribunal 
to prosecute violators of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY is 
located in The Hague, Netherlands, as opposed to the site of conflict.201 This was the first 
international criminal tribunal constructed by the United Nations and the first international 
criminal tribunal since the IMT and the IMTFE in the mid-1940s. This court is made up of 
three bodies: the chambers, the office of the prosecutor, and the registry. The chambers is led by 
the President, and contains three trial chambers and an appeals chamber, with three judges each 
trial chambers and five judges in the appeals chamber. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is 
also divided into subsections: the Prosecution Division, Immediate Office, and Appeals Division. 
The Prosecution Division is responsible for the preparation and presentation of materials for the 
prosecution side of the trial. The Intermediate Office handles the functional side of the OTP — 
budgeting, formulating policy, transferring cases, et cetera. Finally, the Appeals Division handles 
all aspects of cases in the appeals process. The Registry maintains the practical functioning of the 
court — administrative duties, overall policy, and legal support are among its duties. The ICTY 
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has pressed charges against 161 people and carried out 126 cases with the apprehension of Goran 
Hadžić, the last fugitive to the Court, on July 22, 2011.  
 At its inception, the ICTY indicated its concern to ensure that sexual and gender based 
violence crimes would be prosecuted. This intention is evidently clear when reading early 
Security Council Resolutions regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the formation of the 
ICTY. Security Council Resolution 798 (1992) is exemplary of this and is the first resolution to 
denounce rape in war, announcing that the Security Council was “appalled by reports of the 
massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”202 Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali highlighted the 
“widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced 
prostitution.”203 The Secretary General made history when the proposed statute for the ICTY 
enumerated rape as a crime against humanity.204 When discussing the protection of victims in 
Article 23(c), the Secretary General noted the importance of providing sufficient protection to 
witnesses and victims, especially in cases of rape and sexual assault. The Secretary General took 
into account “the nature of the crimes committed and the sensitivities of victims of rape and 
sexual assault, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff to the employment 
of qualified women”205 when staffing the OTP. These suggestions made by the Secretary 
General were readily accepted and worked into the Statutes of both the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In the 
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Statute of the ICTY, the incorporation of sexual and gender based violence as a crime against 
humanity can clearly be seen in Article 5(g), which gave the ICTY jurisdiction over persons 
committing rape in armed conflict against civilians. The Statute addressed the widespread use of 
SGBV during the Yugoslav Wars, “expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of 
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law … including reports of … 
massive, organized, and systematic detention and rape of women.”206 The Statute itself 
represents progress from the first international tribunal, where SGBV was ignored.  
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the ICTY’s later counterpart, 
continued to bolster the progress on prosecuting sexual and gender based violence made in the 
early 1990s. After taking very little action during the Rwandan genocide,207the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 995 establishing the legal basis for the ICTR. Resolution 995 invoked its 
Chapter VII powers to establish another ad hoc court, the ICTR. The ICTR is very similar in 
structure to the ICTY, even sharing the Appeals Chamber with the ICTY in The Hague. The 
tribunal itself was situated in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR has indicted 93 individuals and of 
these cases, 62 were charged, fourteen were acquitted, ten were referred back to national courts, 
three fugitives were referred to the MICT,208 two were deceased before trials began, and two 
indictments were withdrawn prior to trial.209 
 The ICTR goes beyond its counterpart when prosecuting sexual and gender based 
violence. Where the Statute of the ICTY only explicitly listed rape as a crime against humanity, 
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the ICTR includes SGBV within its definition of both war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.210 In Article 4, in which the ICTR accounts for a nonexhaustive list of qualifying war 
crimes, “rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”211 is listed as an outrage 
upon personal dignity. Substantial progress was made in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR 
themselves, further expansion of the scope in which sexual and gender based violence is 
prosecuted can be attributed to cases heard before the ad hoc tribunals.  
 
Feminist Victories and Defeats on the ICTY and ICTR Statutes 
 Throughout the actual drafting process, feminists experienced a mixed bag of victories — 
mostly incremental and related to definitions within the statutes. Janet Halley argues that the 
largest feminist victory at the statute drafting process of the ad hoc tribunals related to the 
definition of rape as a crime against humanity. At the ICTY, rape as a crime against humanity is 
limited to taking place during an armed conflict. The ICTR Statute offers a more narrow 
definition of what qualifies as an armed conflict: the potential crime against humanity must be 
“committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on 
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”212 The strict definitions of armed conflict 
at the ad hoc tribunals is unfavorable in broadening the ability of SGBV to be prosecuted, and 
this expansion became a goal of feminist activists at Rome. Despite this, SGBV entered the 
pantheon of punishable IHL crimes with the caveat that it must fit the narrow crimes against 
humanity definitions, and this should be considered an ultimate victory for the ad hoc tribunals.  
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Ad Hoc Case Law as a Framework for the International Criminal Court 
 Both ad hoc tribunals tried groundbreaking cases regarding sexual and gender based 
violence. These cases were involved in not only the tribunals’ existing definitions of crimes 
against humanity, but included landmark cases defining relationships between SGBV and 
genocide, war crimes, and torture, among others. This section analyzes a number of key cases 
that contributed to evolving definitions of rape and other forms of SGBV. The case law that 
emerged from both ad hoc tribunals greatly impacted the Rome Statute’s approach to sexual and 
gender based violence.  
Goldstone and Dehon note that the initial prosecution of SGBV were slowed by the 
initial cases chosen by the ICTY — in a rush to “issue its first indictment in order to obtain 
crucial funding from the General Assembly of the United Nations … the decision was made to 
indict Dragan Nikolić.”213 Nikolić was the Commander of the Sušica detention camp in 
Vlasenica; however, due to the funding-related time constraints the OTP decided to forego 
charging Nikolić with gender-related crimes. The decision not to investigate SGBV crimes did 
not last long. As the trial began, “evidence began to emerge that many of the women detained in 
the camp were subjected to sexual assaults, including rape.”214 This led Judge Odio-Benito, one 
of two women judges at the time, to publicly call on the Office of the Prosecutor to include 
SGBV charges in the indictments. Citing witness testimony, the three Trial Chamber judges 
commented: 
The Trial Chamber feels that the prosecutor may be well advised to review these 
statements carefully with a view to ascertaining whether to charge Dragan Nikolić 
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with rape and other forms of sexual assault, either as a crime against humanity or 
as grave breaches [of the Geneva Conventions] or as war crimes.215 
Not only is this statement by the trial judges commendable in its efforts to include SGBV crimes 
in its first indictment, the language of the statement is not only limited to the possibility of 
prosecuting SGBV as a crime against humanity. Prosecuting SGBV as a war crime or a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions had the potential to be jurisprudentially groundbreaking for 
the future of SGBV prosecution throughout the ICTY. In 2003, the Appeals Chamber 
sentenced Nikolić to twenty years in prison for charges of crimes against humanity, with charges 
of sexual violence and rape.  
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (1998) was the third judgment to be rendered by the 
ICTY and again contributed significantly to SGBV prosecution. Furundžija, the local 
Commander of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), stood trial for charges of war crimes for 
his involvement in the torture, rape, and sexual assault of a woman under interrogation by the 
HVO. The OTP based the charge of rape as a war crime on Article 4(2)(e) of Additional 
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which explicitly (and problematically) includes rape as 
an outrage of personal dignity. The Tribunal readily agreed with the OTP and stated that “rape 
in the time of war is prohibited both by treaty law and, most significantly, as a matter of 
customary international law.”216 The Tribunal charged Furundžija with aiding and abetting the 
rape of the victim and rape as an outrage upon personal dignity.217 In response, Furundžija’s 
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defense accused Judge Florence Mumba, one of three judges assigned to his case, of bias due to 
her past involvement in the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women and their 
campaign to reaffirm rape as a war crime.218 The case went on to the Appeals Chamber, where 
the following statement was released:  
With regard to the affirmation by the International Tribunal of rape as a war 
crime, the Appeals Chamber finds that the international community has long 
recognized rape as a war crime. In the Čelebići judgment, one of the accused was 
convicted of torture by means of rape, as a violation of the laws or customs of war. 
This recognition by the international community of rape as a war crime is also 
reflected in the Rome Statute where it is designated as a war crime.219 
The Appeals Chamber released this judgment in 2000, well after the Rome Statute had been 
adopted, but not yet entered into force. The ICTY’s reference to the Rome Statute in this case is 
telling: Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) and Article 8(2)(e)(vi) are two pieces of law that establish SGBV as 
self-standing war crimes, not a subset of outrages upon personal dignity. Thus, the Appeals 
Chamber suggests that rape in this case is also a self-standing war crime.220 
 This view of sexual and gender based violence has been reaffirmed by the ICTY in a 
second case, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač, and Zoran Vukovič (1996). The 
OTP initially charged the defendants with sixteen counts of rape as crimes against humanity; 
however, in July of 1998, the charges were amended to “charge six counts of rape as ‘a violation 
of the laws or customs of war, punishable under Article 3 of the statute of the tribunal and 
recognised by Additional Protocol II Article 4 (rape) of the Geneva Conventions,’ separate from 
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the two remaining charges of outrages against personal dignity.”221 The next year, the amended 
version of the charges against Kunarac et al encompassed three of seven counts of rape as a war 
crime with simplified language: “Rape, a violation of the laws or customs of war, punishable 
under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal.”222 In their judgment, the Trial Chambers found 
that “common Article 3 alone is sufficient in principle to form the basis of these charges under 
Article 3.”223 The decisions in both Furundžija and Kunarac worked towards establishing rape 
not only as a distinct crime against humanity, but also as a war crime separate from outrages 
against personal dignity. The Appeals Chamber wrote that “even if the perpetrator is motivated 
by the desire for sexual gratification, this does not rule out proof of intent for torture.”224 In 
addition to Kunarac’s contribution to defining rape as a distinct war crime, the case also made 
history for including sexual slavery as crime against humanity.225  
 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalič et al, also known as the Čelebići case226 broke ground in 
charging rape as a form of torture. In response to the Appeals Chamber’s statement in the 
previous paragraph, the OTP “began to take imaginative steps to prosecute gender crimes as war 
crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.”227 One such tactic employed by the 
OTP has been to use rape and sexual assault as actus reus, “guilty deed in law Latin, of other war 
crimes or grave breaches enumerated in the Statutes of the Tribunals.”228 SGBV is used as a 
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constituent element of another grave breach, i.e. torture, to charge the accused with a grave 
breach while incorporating sexual violence crimes. This method was used in the Delalić case, 
where prisoners of the Čelebići camp reported repeated incidents of rape. The ICTY conducted a 
thorough examination of the elements of torture and decided that rape constituted a constituent 
element: “The Trial Chamber considers rape of any persons to be a despicable act which strikes 
the very core of human dignity and physical integrity.”229 Goldstone and Dehon aptly express the 
importance of the conflation of SGBV and torture: 
Rape specifically was not enumerated in the list of grave breaches, possibly 
because it was not considered to be a crime of violence of the type deserving of the 
greatest liability under the Conventions ... Gender crimes recognized as grave 
breaches are subject to universal jurisdiction. This development allows for gender 
crimes to be prosecuted by domestic courts, which could facilitate the domestic 
implementation of the substantive and procedural advances made by the 
Tribunals in their analysis and prosecution of gender crimes.230 
The recognition of rape as a form of torture makes clear the possibility that rape as torture may 
be prosecuted as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.231 This case, in combination with 
the jurisprudence of the tribunal and a statement released by the International Committee for 
the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1991 affirmed the possible use of SGBV as torture to be a grave breach 
of the Geneva Conventions. This was a breakthrough in IHL, as grave breaches are subject to 
universal jurisdiction.  
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 Moving to the ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu affirmed that certain acts of 
SGBV may constitute genocide. Following the pattern of many of the previously discussed cases, 
Akayesu originally did not encompass SGBV charges; however, upon hearing witness 
testimonies that referenced the widespread presence of SGBV in the Taba commune, where 
Akayesu was the mayor and his implicitly supported the crimes. Judge Navanethem, one of the 
few women judges on the ICTR, observed the presence of sexual violence. Her observation, in 
combination with a amicus curiae brief filed by the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in 
Conflict Situations requesting the addition of SGBV charges to the indictment, led the ICTR to 
prosecute Akayesu for such crimes. The tribunal used the outrages upon personal dignity mode 
of thought when examining this case, and recognized that “rape committed with the aid of a 
public official [Mayor Akayesu] is torture.”232 The ICTR found Akayesu guilty of crimes against 
humanity and “genocide for aiding, abetting, ordering, or encouraging, and sometimes 
witnessing, more than two dozen rapes and other sexual assaults at the bureau communal where, 
by dint of his authority, he could have prevented them.”233 The judgment of Akayesu allowed for 
the possibility of sexual and gender based violence to be charged as a crime of genocide.234 
 
Conclusion 
 There are significant parallels and overlap between the ad hoc cases and the ICC in both 
legislation and adjudication. These parallels, as we shall see, did not go unnoticed by feminists at 
Rome. “The ad hoc tribunals by trying and convicting perpetrators [of sex-based crimes] 
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fomented a legal climate beyond its jurisdiction that made it conducive to draft several sex-based 
crimes into the Rome Statute of the ICC,”235 Patricia Viseur Sellers reflects. Due to the 
involvement WCGJ members in the ad hoc tribunals and vice versa, many of the arguments used 
at Rome are a reflection of the ad hoc drafting process outcomes. For example, feminists at 
Rome borrowed from lines of argument in the Čelebići case when advocating for the admission of 
rape in the Rome Statute’s list of grave breaches.236 It is of the utmost importance to consider the 
statutes and cases of the ad hoc tribunals when discussing the ICC due to the interconnected 
nature of the courts. The WCGJ’s ability to take hold of the anti-impunity momentum that 
spurred the move to tribunals was necessary to their overall success at the ICC, as well as the 
establishment of the Court itself. As this chapter has conveyed, the development of both 
international criminal tribunals and sexual violence crimes under international humanitarian law 
was sluggish until the 1990s, when anti-impunity swept the human rights movement. The 
timing of the justice cascade and the preeminence of the transnational women’s network by the 
UN conferences in the 1990s was no coincidence. Both events were the result of the “epochal 
ruptures of the late twentieth century”237 identified by Hoffmann from which human rights 
entered global politics as an irreplaceable concept. Without the two, it is unlikely that the 
International Criminal Court would have gained traction at the United Nations. Likewise, 
without the pre-established transnational women’s network at prior conferences, the WCGJ 
would not have been able to impact the Rome Statute on sexual and gender based violence. 
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Chapter Three: Feminist Activism and the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court 
 
“Women have a lot to say about how to advance women’s rights, and governments need to learn from 
that, listen to the movement and respond.”  
- Charlotte Bunch238 
 
 This chapter is a critical examination of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice’s role in 
the foundation of the International Criminal Court. After experiencing the wide success of the 
transnational women’s network at UN conferences, the WCGJ was founded as a direct 
outgrowth of the transnational women’s network. The WCGJ benefitted from the extreme 
organization of the first modern network. I argue that this piece of the story to follow was the 
fortuitous confluence of the mainstreaming of VAW beginning two decades prior, the justice 
cascade that led to the rise of criminal tribunals, and the eventual founding of the ICC in the 
wake of the ad hoc tribunals. This project argues that these events were all brought about by the 
human rights wave of the twentieth century, as identified by Hoffmann.  
 Like the chapters before, it is essential to tell the story of becoming; that is, engage 
deeply with the temporally and legally complex events that aided in the establishment of the ICC 
by way of thick description. As previously discussed in the Introduction, this project is not a total 
endorsement of the WCGJ and is critical of the structuralist-feminist ideology that prevailed in 
the Caucus. The issues that the WCGJ fought for at negotiations was wide-sweeping, and for 
the sake of length, this chapter will focus on a handful of key issues related to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. These subsections are as follows: gender and gender violence 
definitions; delinking honor and dignity from SGBV; listing SGBV as a grave breach; (en)forced 
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pregnancy; sexual slavery; and structural and procedural reforms. This chapter will trace just how 
the WCGJ was able to mainstream gender, examine the influence of ad hoc case law, and convey 
the confluence of interconnected events that allowed the WCGJ to accomplish what they did at 
Rome.  
 
Establishing an International Criminal Court: A Short History 
After the globe was shook by the horrors of the World Wars and the fall of the Soviet 
Union, a renewed sense of urgency developed for the creation of a permanent international 
criminal court. In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago asked the United Nations General Assembly to 
request that the International Law Commission to resume its work on an international criminal 
court, initially for the purpose of establishing a venue to prosecute international drug trafficking 
cases. The concept of an international criminal court was far from new, with direct efforts 
spanning as far back as 1899 from the First Hague Convention for the Settlement of 
International Disputes, the first international effort to proscribe war crimes. In 1907, the Second 
Hague Convention dealt with the issue of obligatory arbitration with support from major world 
powers, including the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. The interwar period saw an 
effort by the newly formed League of Nations to create a court. The League called for a 
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920 to settle disputes between states with proposals 
from Allied powers “containing various international rules of culpability for human rights abuses 
and aggression (for starting wars with no legitimate pretext).”239 The League of Nations 
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produced the Convention for the Creation of an International Court in 1937, however by that 
time the League was losing its credibility and not enough members signed. 
The post-war era ushered in a new period of tribunals that set new standards for 
international criminal law. The military tribunals, discussed in Chapter 1, have been considered 
to be widely successful, despite their specific gender-related shortcomings. The tribunals were 
imperfect: Nuremberg garnered more media attention, which “may have had to do with the 
Nuremberg Trial becoming a show trial, as it did the disorderly manner in which the IMTFE 
was conducted.”240 This was in part due to legitimacy of the new United Nations Charter that 
“established the conditions for the suspension of state consent or the norm of non-intervention, 
[and] provided an important link between the tribunal and universal jurisdiction”241 under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. The pioneering success of the military tribunals influenced the 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Genocide in 
defining many modern day war crimes. 
Between the post-war trials and the end of the Cold War, there was not very much in the 
way of progress on international criminal courts until the establishment of ad hoc tribunals in the 
early 1990s. In the post-Cold War period, ICTY and ICTR were created by the Security 
Council’s invocation of its Chapter VII powers. The ICTY and ICTR were applauded for their 
ability to eliminate the politics of victor’s justice by allowing the trials to be run by the more 
impartial United Nations. While both ad hoc tribunals were regarded as a major advancement in 
international criminal law, they faced major limitations foreshadowing many of the International 
Criminal Court’s shortcomings. In a physical sense, the tribunals were lauded as costly and 
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inefficient: whereas by 2005, the ICTY accumulated a budget of $650 million and the ICTR 
lacked the resources to prosecute many of the widespread perpetrators of the genocide. Second, 
the ad hoc nature of the tribunals limited their scope to a certain defined territory or region. 
Lastly, the tribunals were plagued by the contradiction of state sovereignty: “the permanent 
members of the Security Council would never have consented to allow the investigation of their 
own generals”242 and had the ability to veto any prosecution of their own military personnel 
stationed in the region. In return, “the International Criminal Court provides an arguably more 
autonomous, less entrenched legal institution, insofar as it is rooted in treaty law or state 
consent.”243 While the International Court of Justice at The Hague handles cases between states, 
at the time, no court existed to handle cases between individuals.  
Almost a hundred years after the First Hague Convention, the International Law 
Commission produced a draft statute for the International Criminal Court at the behest of 
Trinidad and Tobago. Throughout 1995 and 1997, preparatory committees met six times to 
draft the statute for the International Criminal Court, and in June of 1998, 168 state delegations 
and several delegates from international organizations met to negotiate the Rome Statute. At the 
beginning of the conference, the draft statute produced by its formal preparatory committee was 
riddled with over 1,700 square brackets, each marking points of disagreement between states. 
The group of states that emerged to work on the draft statute, mostly European and several 
Latin American states, became known as the Like-Minded Group: 
The Like-Minded Group conceived of themselves as depoliticized in an 
important sense: they lacked strong political interests and strategic entanglements 
in many parts of the world. Because they were not global powers, they thought of 
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themselves as more able to construct international architecture that would be 
perceived as fair and legitimate by the rest of the world ... powerful states with 
complex interests had limited ability to advance impartial international justice.244 
The P5 remained wary of the statute and sought to preserve their Security Council privileges. 
The P5 suggested that the Security Council, as to be expected, should control the new court; 
however, this was met with great resistance, especially by Germany. William Pace, the leader of 
the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, warned that “some countries...want the court 
to be controlled by the Security Council, reducing the ICC to a sham status of a ‘permanent’ ad 
hoc tribunal; one which would dispense international criminal justice only to small and weak 
countries, never to violators in powerful nations.”245 In the summer of 1997, Singaporean 
diplomats offered an important compromise between the Security Council and the LMG: the 
Council could possess limited powers over the Court, and if the Council agrees that a particular 
inquiry were to be counterproductive, they could halt the investigation for a certain period of 
time. The Security Council would have the ability to refer cases to the court, but the P5 
members would not be able to block cases on their own. Several elections in the P5 countries 
conveniently strengthened the possibility for the ICC’s success: President Bill Clinton was 
reelected; in May of 1997, Britain’s left-leaning Labour Party came into power for the first time 
in almost two decades with Tony Blair as Prime Minister; and in France, the Pluralist Left246 
won a majority in the National Assembly. Soon after, Britain joined the LMG and supported 
Singapore’s compromise and France decided that it “had to end up on the ‘right’ side of 
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negotiations, but that the concerns of the military had to be addressed.”247 The Clinton 
administration remained ambivalent to the Court, still desiring P5 control. Prior to Britain 
joining the LMG, the P5 attempted to propose a second compromise with language 
“prevent[ing] the court from exercising jurisdiction over the ‘official actions’ of nonmember states 
and would include a broad opt-out provision.”248 Despite the short burst of hope with the 
reelection of President Clinton, most advocates for the Court were aware that the United States 
and other major powers would not support it. Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch recalled 
the desire to set in motion a longer process: 
There was at least an implicit recognition that a number of heavyweights were 
going to remain outside the court and that the imperative was to push the 
negotiation across the finish line ... and even with the disadvantage of several 
heavyweights on the outside, rely on the momentum that the like-minded group 
would provide, rely on that quantitative mass and the sense of momentum, to pull 
along those heavyweights who were not so favorably disposed.249 
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted in a vote of 120-7 with 21 abstentions.250 The 
final version of the Rome Statute reflected the compromises made, “requiring the ICC to obtain 
Security Council permission to proceed and precluding the Security Council from any ability to 
stop investigations.”251 The compromise allows the Security Council to perform its Charter VII 
duties while preventing the P5 from unilaterally abusing their veto power to halt investigations. 
Almost fifty years after the success of the Allied-led International Military Tribunals, “the most 
powerful states were losing their grip on the mechanisms of international justice.”252 After nearly 
                                                
247 Ibid. 43.  
248 Ibid. 49-50. 
249 Ibid. 49.  
250 The United States, China, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Cuba, and Yemen opposed the statute. 
251 Christopher Joyner, International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 157. 
252 Bosco, Rough Justice, 51.  
 
 
77 
a century of attempts to institutionalize international criminal accountability, the International 
Criminal Court was established. 
         The International Criminal Court is governed by complementarity, a principle that 
distinguishes it from the ad hoc tribunals. Complementarity limits the scope of the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction by recognizing the primacy of domestic jurisdiction and the right of 
the state to prosecute international crimes. The International Criminal Court “may only exercise 
jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so, including where they purport to act but in 
reality are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.”253 Complementarity intended 
to allow states prima facie to investigate and prosecute its own crimes. This increases efficiency, 
as “states will generally have the best access to evidence and witnesses and the resources to carry 
out proceedings.”254 Complementarity is a reasonable compromise between state sovereignty and 
the jurisdiction of the Court. State sovereignty is respected until it is proven that the state is 
unwilling or unable to prosecute in a timely and effective manner. While complementarity is an 
important advancement in international law, it also complicates and slows the trial process by 
entangling it with state cooperation.  
 
The Road to Rome: Feminists in the Negotiation Process 
 As seen in the various United Nations conferences discussed in Chapter 1, by the mid-
1990s NGOs grew to be an integral component of negotiations. In 1996 during PrepComI 
process, William Pace formed the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) as a 
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means of coordinating pro-ICC NGOs.255 While the primary focus of the CICC was to 
promote the creation of the ICC, the CICC also became an advocate for the involvement of 
NGOs in PrepComs and the Conference itself. Throughout the PrepComs, the CICC 
unsurprisingly found allies in the Like-Minded Group. At the third meeting of PrepComI, 
NGOs were permitted to register for all informal and formal meetings.256 By the time of the 
Rome Diplomatic Conference, the United Nations released a resolution requesting to allow the 
participation of NGOs.257 NGO input grew to be valued more as expertise as opposed to 
lobbying, signaling a shift from Mexico City, where NGOs struggled to involve themselves. Zoe 
Pearson, a legal scholar at Keele University, interviewed delegates at Rome and wrote: 
The reputation that NGOs earned as reliable and knowledgeable sources of 
information, prepared to engage in a professional way about the subject matter of 
ICC issues, greatly contributed to the receptiveness of [S]tates to their positions 
and assisted the good working relationships that evolved between many NGOs 
and state delegations.258 
Within the CICC, the 316 members split off into four working groups, including one on women 
— the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice.259  
 The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice was a direct outgrowth of the transnational 
women’s network that solidified at the UN conferences discussed in Chapter 1. As such, the 
WCGJ can be very clearly identified as a international and domestic nongovernmental research 
and advocacy organization260 network using Keck and Sikkink’s classifications. Within Keck and 
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Sikkink’s typology of networks, the WCGJ should be categorized as an information politics 
network.261 At the PrepComs and Rome, the WCGJ was the only coalition that focused on 
gender issues and served as the primary source of information and guidance for this topic.262 
Keck and Sikkink’s definition of an information politics network does not completely fit the 
WCGJ, however. Keck and Sikkink make a careful distinction of information politics networks 
providing something separate from what ‘qualified’ experts do. The WCGJ was inherently a 
group of legal experts, with many members who would likely argue that the WCGJ provided 
alternate, expert, sources of information. Due to the level of access that NGOs were afforded 
during Rome process, the WCGJ served as an information network from within. The Women’s 
Caucus should be viewed as an extension of the transnational women’s network against VAW. 
Given this, as well as the clear fit within Keck and Sikkink’s definition of an activist network, the 
WCGJ should be classified as a transnational network. 
 The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice emerged as the leading feminist group widely 
credited for incorporating a “stronger gender perspective throughout … [the Rome Statute’s] 
text.”263 The WCGJ was an officially recognized264 coalition of women’s NGOs consisting of 
200 affiliates by the beginning of the Conference. The WCGJ is comparable to the Women’s 
Caucuses of Rio, Vienna, and Cairo in its mission: “it consolidated a coherent platform for 
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feminist reform and lobbied hard in the Rome Statute negotiations.”265 Many of the activists on 
the WCGJ were active contributors to law reviews, where they testified to their own successes.266 
Barbara Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez credit the WCGJ’s success to their “persistent 
lobbying efforts.” Hilary Charlesworth concurs: “This recognition ... was the result of 
considerable work and lobbying by women’s organizations.”267 Bedont and Hall-Martinez argue 
that “women’s rights activists viewed the negotiations for the ICC as a historic opportunity to 
address the failures of earlier international treaties and tribunals to properly delineate, investigate, 
and prosecute wartime violence against women.”268 The WCGJ has been commended for its 
influence in the codification of SGBV crimes as crimes against humanity and war crimes; 
however, the scope of the Caucus was far more broad and included advocacy for the protection of 
victims and witnesses, fair representation and gender expertise on the Court, and work on 
specific definitions within the Rome Statute, such as gender and gender violence. 
 This Chapter will begin by exploring goals of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice 
before and throughout the Rome Conference and will conclude with an analysis of the respective 
success of their goals. Members of the WCGJ and judges at the ICC alike often wrote accounts 
of their work in law reviews and provided a unique window into the modus operandi of their 
movement. Janet Halley reflects that initially there appeared to be a substantial amount of 
consensus:  
[T]hey wanted authoritative enumeration of sexual crimes in their own terms. 
They wanted to establish that rape, sexual violence, and sexual slavery are 
IHL/ICL crimes. They wanted these sexual crimes to be lodged as high up in the 
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hierarchy of IHL/ICL codification as they could get them, and in terms that 
derive from their shared feminist understanding of them.269 
Thus, the feminist goals are twofold: push SGBV crimes up hierarchically and influence the legal 
language to reflect a shared value system. While there was a clear consensus on a majority of 
feminist goals, sharp disagreement emerged over two subjects: the role of SGBV in genocide, 
and sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, and sex trafficking.  
 
Defining Gender & Gender Violence 
 The first major challenge faced by members of the WCGJ was over the inclusion of 
‘crimes of gender violence’ into the final version of the Rome Statute. This ambition was new to 
the ICC, with references to ‘gender violence’ nowhere to be found in the ad hoc tribunals.270 
Bedont and Hall-Martinez briefly explain the difference between ‘sexual violence’ and ‘gender 
violence’:  
The Women’s Caucus pushed for the term “gender” as opposed to “sex because 
the latter is restricted to the biological differences between men and women, 
whereas gender includes differences between men and women because of their 
socially constructed roles. Similarly, “gender crimes” is preferable to “sexual 
violence” because it includes crimes which are targeted at men or women because 
of their gender roles which may not have a sexual element.271 
While the ‘gender violence’ is inclusive of ‘sexual violence,’ the reverse is untrue, as ‘sexual 
violence’ disregards the expansive forms of violence that people face based on their societally 
prescribed gender roles. Examples of gender violence include the “impress[ion of women] into 
maternity … a form of gender enslavement. The same is true when women are impressed into 
providing domestic services whether on a large scale or individualized basis (forced temporary 
                                                
269 Halley, “Rape at Rome,” 49-50. 
270 Ibid. 82. 
271 Bedont and Hall-Martinez, “Ending Impunity,” 68. 
 
 
82 
marriage).”272 Not only would the proposed addition of gender violence cover more abuses faced 
by women, this new crime would incorporate practices that affect men and LGBTQ+ people. 
On occasion in the WCGJ’s Recommendations, they would offer salient examples of the ways in 
which gender violence affects men: “Gender based persecution … is involved when young boys 
are either killed to prevent their becoming soldiers or coerced and humiliated into becoming 
killers.”273 
 This conflict is complicated by the seemingly odd definition of gender ultimately adopted 
in the Rome Statute. As seen with the previous conflicts between Women’s Caucuses and 
conservative state alliances at UN conferences, negotiations on material relating to a plethora of 
gender-based issues (e.g. sexuality or abortion) are tenuous at best and require an extreme 
amount of compromise. The definition of ‘gender’ in Article 7(3) of the Statute reads: “For the 
purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and 
female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different 
from the above.”274 The conflation of sex and gender stands out: while it seems to erase the 
difference of the two terms, the definition provides for sex/gender to be understood within 
societal contexts. The United Nations has historically neglected to define gender in multilateral 
human rights documents due to a lack of consensus between states as to the actual meaning of 
gender.275 The final definition of gender within the Statute garnered criticism from those within 
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the WCGJ, including Charlesworth and Copelon, for its “peculiar and circular”276 language, the 
result of intense negotiation. Given the inclusion of “within the context of society” in the article, 
it is doubtful that the ICC will adopt a biologically determinist interpretation of ‘gender.’ 
Further, Valerie Oosterveld, legal theorist and member of the Canadian delegation to Rome, 
argues, “the criticisms of the Rome Statute’s definition of ‘gender’ highlight the fact that the 
term is undertheorized in international law.”277 
 Oosterveld’s suggestion — that gender is underdeveloped under international law — may 
account for the difficulties experienced by the WCGJ in establishing the concept of gender 
violence in the Rome Statute. The WCGJ likely faced a strong resistance from many states given 
their structuralist-feminist framing of gender violence. Janet Halley argues that the WCGJ often 
erased the trauma faced by men and boys in favor of a model that highlighted the subordination 
of women: “Trauma to boys is problematic because it produces an ideology of ‘masculinity,’ 
ratifying ‘patriarchal values,’ and thus discriminates against women.”278 Similarly, from a WCGJ 
Recommendation:  
Sexual violence, whether directed against women or men, is usually a form of 
gender violence, since it is an attacked [sic] based on and intended to destroy 
one’s gender identity, whether masculine or feminine. That is, women are raped, 
for example, to control and destroy them as women and to signal male ownership 
over them as property; men are raped to humiliate them though [sic] forcing them 
to experience the position of women and, thereby, rendering them, according to 
the prevailing stereotypes, weak and inferior.279 
In a subsequent briefing paper, the WCGJ offers a distinctly structuralist interpretation of the 
Tadić case: “A man was tortured when another prisoner was forced to bite off his testicle. The 
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sexual organs of the man were targeted in order to take away his male identity and make him like 
a woman.”280 The WCGJ’s undue focus on male identity in this statement is rather problematic 
and ushered a resistance from at least sixteen states.281 The majority of the states strongly 
opposing the WCGJ’s attempt to include gender violence in the Rome Statute mostly came from 
the ‘Unholy Alliance’ — Catholic and Islamic states heavily influenced by their religious roots. 
Gender violence was initially present at PrepComI, but it eventually became the subject of an 
intense battle. The WCGJ ultimately surrendered in order to preserve other victories. Bedont 
and Martinez-Hall reflect, “The dispute regarding terminology threatened the inclusion of 
certain gender crimes, of a non-discrimination clause, and of special protective measures under 
the procedural provisions.”282 On the matter of gender violence, the WCGJ were sharply 
defeated. 
 
Honor, Dignity, & The Geneva Conventions 
 Due to the tendency of major international humanitarian law documents to discard 
SGBV as a subsidiary crime — affecting the “honor” of a woman, yet not serious enough to be a 
grave breach — feminists sought to elevate SGBV to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions 
at Rome. Jennifer Green, Rhonda Copelon, Patrick Cotter, and Beth Stephens published a 
lengthy document, nicknamed the CUNY Clinic Memorandum,283 essentially a feminist 
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blueprint for a new court. The CUNY Clinic Memorandum is a strong example of the use of law 
review articles to outline objectives far before the Rome Conference occurred. Green, Copelon, 
Cotter, and Stephens argue extensively for the inclusion of SGBV crimes (specifically rape, 
forced prostitution, and forced pregnancy) as a grave breach: “Every act of rape in war — 
whether a consequence of indiscipline, retaliation, or genocidal policies — is a ‘grave breach,’ a 
principle that has been recently reaffirmed by international scholars and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.”284 This memorandum, written in 1994, relies on drawing the link 
between SGBV (not grave breaches) and torture (grave breach) in order to assert that SGBV 
crimes are, in fact, able to be categorized as such as opposed to honor crimes.285 It should be 
noted that the Deliać case from the ICTY uses this line of reasoning to charge rape as a 
constituent element of torture in 1996.286 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin assert that 
another reason to view SGBV as a grave breach instead of a crime against humanity lies in the 
individualization of the crime. By charging a rape, for example, as a crime against humanity, this 
would reason that the rape caused an ultimate harm to humanity. If the rape were to be 
considered a grave breach, the crime may be addressed as an individualized wrong and offer the 
possibility for a focus on gender in the proceedings.287 The use of torture to constitute rape as a 
grave breach was less than ideal for many, as the ultimate goal of the WCGJ at Rome was to 
explicitly stipulate that rape itself was a grave breach. In order to move SGBV up the IHL 
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hierarchy, the WCGJ had to transgress the glaring obstacle of regarding SGBV as a violation of 
honor and dignity.  
 As recently as the ICTR Statute, language still tied SGBV to outrages upon personal 
dignity.288 Delinking SGBV crimes from honor became central to feminists working on the 
Rome Statute and was an area where most were in agreement. Valerie Oosterveld argues, “The 
outdated and potentially harmful message that these violent, physical crimes were to be evaluated 
based on the harm done to the victims honour, modesty, or chastity.”289 The Geneva and Hague 
Conventions’ proscription of SGBV crimes as a morality issue diminishes its gravity and 
distances the perpetrator from the crime by focusing on the supposed ‘degradation’ of the 
woman. This sentiment is echoed by numerous feminist authors who urge the Rome Statute to 
forsake this antiquated ideology. Moreover, Hilary Charlesworth notes, “[Article 27 of the 
Geneva Conventions] assumes that women should be protected from sexual crimes because they 
implicate a woman’s honor, reinforcing the notion of women as men’s property rather than 
because they constitute violence.”290 Delinking SGBV and honor was an attempt to send the 
feminist message that “rape is a crime of sexual violence,”291 a fairly radical message for the 1990s 
and an immense achievement. Addressing sexual violence as sexual violence massively broadened 
the IHL lexicon: “[SGBV] is a sexual assault; it is violent and physical; it causes physical and 
emotional (or physical and psychological) harm; it is painful.”292  
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 The WCGJ was partially successful in their attempts to reclassify SGBV. The WCGJ 
urged drafters at Rome to inscribe rape and other forms of SGBV as a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions, prosecutable as war crime, and classified this as “of fundamental 
importance;”293 however, SGBV continued to be left out in this respect. The Rome Statute 
continued to use the phrase ‘outrages upon personal dignity,’ while divorcing sexual violence 
from this article and removing the use of the word ‘honor.’ Article 8.2(b)(xxi) addresses personal 
dignity as a violation of the customs of war: “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment.”294 This article differs starkly from the ICTR Statute in 
that it removes all references to SGBV as a form of an outrage upon personal dignity.295 The 
Rome Statute dedicates an article solely to SGBV crimes: “rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”296 are all offenses prosecutable as a 
serious violation of the laws and customs of war. Language at the end of Article 8(2)(xxii) deems 
that ‘other forms’ of sexual violence may “constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.” 
Although the WCGJ was unable to codify SGBV crimes as grave breaches, this sentence allows 
for the possibility that sexual violence may be prosecuted in conjunction with grave breaches, as 
enumerated in Article 8(2)(a). This development was clearly not ideal for the WCGJ but, as 
Bedont and Hall-Martinez write, “this characterization of sexual violence crimes is … important 
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to the ICC’s capacity to indict sexual violence crimes in multiple ways.”297 The Rome Statute, for 
the first time, delinked honor and dignity from sexual violence crimes. 
 
(En)forced Pregnancy 
 Janet Halley traces notion of prosecuting enforced pregnancy back to a WCGJ 
Recommendation. This recommendation, like the definition of gender in the Statute, was the 
site of fierce debate between the WCGJ and the Holy See, who sought to delete the term. The 
provision including enforced pregnancy as a crime was viewed by the Holy See to endanger 
national laws criminalizing abortion. Similar to the final definition of gender in the Rome 
Statute, the definition of enforced pregnancy was the result of compromises on part of the 
WCGJ. Halley writes that this compromise may have occurred to “disable the religious 
conservative attack, to prevent disagreement from emerging within the WCGJ itself, or both.”298 
In order to quell disagreement, the WCGJ offered the use of ‘forced pregnancy,’ over ‘enforced 
pregnancy,’ to indicate that the crime “is a violent crime, committed with violent intent.”299 
Second, the scope of enforced pregnancy was narrowed to exclude national anti-abortion laws: 
"rape or other sexual abuse carried out with the intent or having the effect of making a woman 
pregnant and/or confining, controlling or coercing a pregnant woman because she is 
pregnant.”300 Less literature on the enforced versus forced pregnancy debate is available in 
comparison to other areas. Although the end definition of forced pregnancy was the result of 
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compromise, the criminalization of the practice should still be considered an overall victory for 
the WCGJ. 
 
Enforced Prostitution, Trafficking, & Sexual Slavery 
 This set of reforms differed from the previously discussed ones in that the issue of sexual 
slavery illuminates a rift between feminists in terms of ideology. The rift that occurred between 
structuralist and liberal feminists on the WCGJ on this topic has been subject of much debate, 
and is still very controversial. Structuralist feminists,301 as per Janet Halley, supported the view 
that all sex work regardless of consent constitutes sexual slavery. Feminists in this vein tended to 
conflate prostitution, trafficking, and sexual slavery.302 On the opposite side, liberal feminists 
tended to differentiate between consensual sex work and ‘enforced prostitution.’ This battle over 
sexual slavery can be traced back to the moral campaigns of the nineteenth century that 
attempted to link trafficking to slavery.303  
One may draw the conclusion that the inclusion of language regarding trafficking of 
women and children in the Rome Statute to be the result of WCGJ advocacy, the 
Recommendations may point to the exact opposite. The December 1997 Recommendations 
used language to describe, but skirt around, trafficking: “enslavement and slavery-like practices in 
all their forms, including by sale, deception, coercion, or threat.”304 At the March 1998 PrepCom 
the WCGJ actively opposed the use of the term trafficking, “because of the need for review of 
                                                
301 “By structuralist I mean that a commitment to the view that the subordination of women is coextensive with 
male/female relations is their structure. In a fully structuralist feminist view of sexuality, no sexual interaction 
between a man and a woman is free from the effects of male domination.” See: Halley, “Rape at Rome,” 91.  
302 Ibid. 92. 
303 See: Teresa Billington-Greig, “The Truth About White Slavery,” The English Review (1913). 
304 Halley, “Rape at Rome,” 93.  
 
 
90 
the international definition of trafficking, the Women’s Caucus suggests instead that the crime 
be described as ‘trade in and coercive or deceptive transport of persons.”305 The preceding quote 
outlines a trend in disagreement that would also appear over ‘enforced prostitution’: due to the 
lack of definitional consensus and disagreement over scope, the WCGJ was unable to endorse 
the inclusion of such terms. Halley argues that the WCGJ’s objections were actually a poor tactic 
to mute the disagreement from within.306 
The presence of both liberal and structural feminists in the WCGJ contributed in part to 
the perceived conflict. For example, the December 1997 Recommendations contained both 
structuralist and liberal ideologies in direct conflict: 
[S]exual enslavement has been diminished by calling it only “enforced 
prostitution.”  
 
The term “enforced prostitution” muffles the degree of violence, coercion and 
control that is characteristic of sexual slavery. It suggests that sexual services are 
provided as part of an exchange albeit one coerced by the circumstances. When, as 
in the Geneva Conventions, forced prostitution is equated within the 
“performance” of degrading acts, the term also suggests that sexual services are 
offered rather than brutally exacted. It hides the fact that this is rape, serial rape, 
physically invasive and psychologically debilitating in the extreme, and that 
women are reduced to and sexually bludgeoned as property, and that they are 
completely under the control of the perpetrator. 
 
History has taught us that most so-called “forced prostitution” during armed 
conflict constitutes sexual slavery.307 
This statement incorporates both structuralist and liberal feminist points of view on sex work, in 
which they are diametrically opposed. The structuralist statement conflates enforced prostitution 
as sexual slavery and rape, and references the male domination of women. The liberal statement 
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does not say that all enforced prostitution is sexual slavery, thereby leaving the possibility that not 
all enforced prostitutions are equivalent to sexual slavery.308 This passage may point to 
disagreement within the WCGJ, or it may be a result of their inability to control the final 
definition in the Rome Statute and a careful attempt to safeguard enforced prostitution from 
being diminished to a lesser crime.  
In Oosterveld’s “Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing 
International Law,” the same strange ideological disagreement is present. Halley argues that 
Oosterveld affirms the sexual autonomy of women as her highest-order issue, but she also adopts 
a position sympathetic to the structuralist inclusion of ‘sexual slavery’ as a crime.309 Sexual slavery 
for Oosterveld manifests itself in defenses of consent by perpetrators: even if the victim claims 
consent, this should not be a permitted defense by perpetrators. “The argument was that women 
who had sex with combatants from the other side of an armed conflict were operating in coercive 
circumstances, and any consent they gave was meaningless, not real consent at all.”310 For Halley, 
Oosterveld is a complex figure. She declares Oosterveld as “one of the Rome process’s liberal 
feminists,”311 but points to her adoption of many structuralist arguments.312 Using Oosterveld as 
an example, Halley argues that the appearance of consensus amongst feminists at Rome may 
actually have been a performed solidarity with the prevailing structuralists.313 
The WCGJ ultimately experienced mostly defeats on the front of sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, and trafficking. In the final Statute, ‘enslavement’ was included as a branch of 
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crimes against humanity: “‘Enslavement’ means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of 
trafficking persons, in particular women and children.”314 The WCGJ never advocated for the 
use of the term ‘enslavement’ or ‘trafficking’ to describe sexual slavery. Subsequently, the 
inclusion of the phrase “in particular, women and children” is one that feminism consistently 
denounces.315 The placement of ‘sexual slavery’ alongside rape in the lists of sexual offenses in the 
Rome Statute as a war crime (international and internal) and crime against humanity was an 
overall positive gain for the WCGJ.316 
 
Procedural and Structural Gender Mainstreaming 
 The International Criminal Court saw expansions in its procedural mechanisms relating 
to evidence and protections for witnesses and victims with regard to sexual and gender based 
violence. The ICC, influenced by ad hoc case law, adopted a number of provisions in the Rules 
and Procedures of Evidence of the ICC that codified “procedural advances in relation to gender 
crimes pioneered by the Tribunals.”317 These progressions, especially in respect to structural 
aspects, are clear manifestations of gender mainstreaming at the International Criminal Court.  
 Rule 63 forbids the Court from imposing requirements that corroboration is established 
to prove crimes, and singles out “crimes of sexual violence.”318 Rule 70 establishes that consent 
cannot be inferred when force is used, the victim is incapable of consenting, from silence or lack 
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of resistance, or from any prior or subsequent sexual conduct of victims.319 Rule 71 adds to Rule 
70, declaring that sexual conduct of victims is inadmissible to the Court. Rules 87 and 88 grants 
protective measures to witnesses and victims, with Rule 88(5) making “special protective 
measures” for victims of sexual violence: “A Chamber shall be vigilant in controlling the manner 
of questioning a witness or victim so as to avoid any harassment or intimidation, paying 
particular attention to victims of crimes of sexual violence.”320 Lastly, Rules 16-19 established the 
ICC’s Victims and Witnesses Unit,321 and held the Registrar responsible for “taking gender-
sensitive measures to facilitate the participation of victims of sexual violence at all stages of the 
proceedings.”322 
 The Rome Statute orders the incorporation of women into the leadership structure of the 
Court. Article 36(8)(a) requires the “fair representation of female and male judges” to be 
considered in the selection process, “as well as fair representation of females and males in the 
selection of staff in the Office of the Prosecutor and in all other organs of the Court.”323 In 2003, 
the first election of the Court’s eighteen judges yielded seven women. Since the historic election, 
a total of fourteen women have served as judges at the ICC. In comparison, the International 
Court of Justices has had four women justices since its inception in 1946.  
Outside of the ICC’s skeleton, the OTP is “required to appoint advisers with legal 
expertise on specific issues including sexual and gender violence [Article 42(9)].”324 Given the 
expansive influence feminists exerted at Rome as experts, both through NGOs and within 
                                                
319 Ibid. Rule 70. 
320 Ibid. Rule 88(5). 
321 Goldstone and Dehon, “Engendering Accountability,” 137. 
322 Rules and Procedures of Evidence, Rule 16(1)(d).  
323 Goldstone and Dehon, “Engendering Accountability,” 136.  
324 Ibid. 136. 
 
 
94 
delegations themselves, it is unsurprising that the language of expertise was included in the final 
document. As previously discussed,325 a facet of Governance Feminism was the move to brand 
“feminism as expertise.”326 At Rome, the WCGJ sought to bring experts on SGBV to the ICC, 
both as judges and advisers. Bedont and Hall-Martinez write, in regards to ICC judges, “The 
ICTY and ICTR are case studies on why it is so crucial to include women as well as men with 
appropriate expertise in international bodies charged with investigating war and conflict 
situations.”327 Bedont and Hall-Martinez’s “call for women was a call for feminists.”328 
 
Conclusion 
 The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice is certainly a network by Keck and Sikkink’s 
standards. The WCGJ is an offshoot of the original transnational women’s network discussed in 
Chapter 1. In the PrepComs and at the Rome Conference, the WCGJ “[became] part of a larger 
policy [community] that group[ed] actors working on an issue”329 by attracting membership and 
support that included members of delegations and support from former ad hoc participants. The 
WCGJ sought to “promote norm implementation by pressuring target actors to adopt new 
policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards.”330 In the case of the 
WCGJ, this pressure was mounted physically at Rome, and the WCGJ continues its monitoring 
today as the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice. 
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 Although the WCGJ suffered resounding losses on some fronts, notably on the 
definitions of gender and gender violence, the Caucus experienced success and partial success in 
many areas. The structural feminism embraced by many members of the WCGJ fell short in its 
“indifference to the suffering and death of men.”331 This is exemplified in the discussion of the 
Tadić case in which the WCGJ placed an undue focus on the negation of masculinity, as 
opposed to the physical harm caused by SGBV crimes that Muslim men faced at several 
concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 Despite ideological criticisms of the WCGJ, or GFeminism, the Caucus made immense 
advancements the legal recognition of the distinct harm faced by those that suffer from SGBV 
crimes in armed conflict. This progress in international humanitarian law and international 
customary law should not be minimized. The phenomenon of the WCGJ at Rome is the direct 
result of the formation of transnational women’s networks, the justice cascade’s shift to anti-
impunity by way of tribunals, and the opportunity to found the International Criminal Court 
itself. The confluence of these three events were temporally limited to the early 1990s due to the 
emergence of human rights idealism and the renewed enthusiasm for the international system as 
identified by Hoffmann.  
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Chapter 4: Sexual Violence Prosecutions at the ICC 
“We know that often holding those who have carried out mass atrocities accountable is at times 
our best tool to prevent future atrocities.” 
-Samantha Power332 
 
 In 2013, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the then Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal 
Court,333 wrote,  “at the Office of the Prosecutor … our vision, and actually our plan is to pursue 
the gender crimes the Rome Statute defines.”334 This chapter sets out to examine just that: has 
the OTP brought sexual violence crimes to the Court? Did Luis Moreno-Ocampo succeed in his 
vision? The aim of this chapter is to discuss the sexual violence cases that have come to the 
International Criminal Court to aid in understanding how the Court ought to move forward 
after its first fifteen years of operation. Maxine Marcus, a former prosecuting attorney at the 
ICTY, reflects: “crimes of sexual and gender-based violence are under-documented and under-
included in cases which are brought before international jurisdictions.”335 Keeping in mind the 
great difficulty in bringing cases of sexual violence to trial, the relative youth of the Court, and 
the amount of time it takes for the Court to operate, I will briefly survey the ICC’s sexual 
violence cases to date.  
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Cases: Past and Pending 
The most notable and only case to be decided in the realm of sexual and gender based 
violence is that of Jean Pierre Gombo Bemba. Bemba was the third person to be convicted by the 
ICC and the first to be convicted of SGBV crimes after fourteen years of operation. Bemba 
stood trial for the crimes committed by soldiers in the Mouvement de libération du Congo336 in 
the Central African Republic between 2002 and 2003 while he was Vice President. Bemba was 
convicted of rape and murder as war crimes and crimes against humanity.337 He was sentenced to 
eighteen years for rape and sixteen years for murder and pillaging, which are being served 
concurrently. Bemba’s sentencing was the longest to date. Dieneke de Vos writes:  
The highest sentence at the ICC to date has been issued for sexual violence is (at a 
minimum) symbolically significant … With the particular focus on sexual violence in 
this case, and the attention paid to the complexity of these crimes in the trial 
judgment and sentencing decision, the reparations order will surely represent yet 
another important milestone for gender justice in international criminal law.338 
Bemba’s case is so powerful due to the place of sexual and gender based violence at the forefront of 
the case, and not a subsidiary crime (as is the historic trend with SGBV). As of the time of writing, is 
still the only conviction in which SGBV is charged. 
 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s case posed the possibility of prosecuting SGBV crimes perpetrated 
against child soldiers recruited by the Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC)339 
where Lubanga was President and Commander-in-Chief. Moreno-Ocampo argues that there was 
evidence present that “showed how Mr. Lubanga instrumentalized sexual violations to subject child 
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soldiers of both sexes to his will, and made them tools to further his own violent goals.”340 Young girl 
soldiers “were used as cooks and fighters, cleaners and spies, scouts and sexual slaves.”341 Moreno-
Ocampo reflects on the duty of the OTP to prosecute: 
It is our responsibility to present the gender crimes suffered by the most vulnerable. 
During the course of the trial, Prosecution has made its mission to ensure that Mr. 
Lubanga be held criminally responsible for the atrocities committed against little girl 
soldiers. In the ICC, girls will not be invisible. The Lubanga ruling could change the 
life of these girls; never again should they be left out of assistance provided by 
demobilization programmes.342  
Ultimately, Lubanga was still convicted for the conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen; 
however, the Court failed to prosecute Lubanga for the sexual abuses faced by children under his 
reign.343 
 Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, respectively the leader and senior 
commander of the Force de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI)344 were prosecuted by the ICC 
for their involvement in the attack on the village of Bogoro in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.345 Among their charges were “gender crimes of sexual slavery and rape, as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.”346 Trial Chamber II found Katanga guilty of one count of crimes 
against humanity and four counts of war crimes,347 and acquitted Chui of his crimes on the 
grounds that the prosecution failed to prove his involvement beyond a reasonable doubt.348 The 
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charges of sexual slavery and rape melted away when the Trial Chambers acquitted both Katanga 
and Chui in this respect.349 
 Persecution on basis of gender, a newly codified form of persecution under the Rome 
Statute, stood a chance to be prosecuted for the first time in 2011. Callixte Mbarishimana, a 
senior Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)350 leader, was accused of 
commissioning the FDLR to commit crimes against humanity of persecution. The charge of 
persecution on the basis of gender arose from instances of rape in villages in North and South 
Kivu.351 The Pre-Trial Chambers refused to confirm the thirteen charges of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes against Mbarushimana and declined the prosecution’s appeal, citing a 
lack of sufficient evidence.352 The International Criminal Court has yet to prosecute any gender-
based persecution crimes.  
 Two cases are currently on trial that include charges of SGBV. Bosco Ntaganda, the 
Commander of Operations for the FPLC — the organization to which Lubanga belonged — 
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faces charges of thirteen counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity for 
crimes committed between 2002-2003. Among these war crimes are rape, sexual slavery of 
civilians, and the rape and sexual slavery of child soldiers.353 Rape and sexual slavery are 
additionally charged as crimes against humanity by the prosecution.354 The trial opened on  
September 2, 2015 and is ongoing.  
 The second case, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, charges the 
former President of the Côte d’Ivoire and the Minister for Sports and Youth, respectively, with 
four crimes against humanity. Rape is included as one of the crimes against humanity charges, 
and one of the events in which Gbagbo and Goudé allegedly had involvement was at a women’s 
march in Abobo on March 3, 2011.355 The two cases were merged on March 11, 2015 and trial 
began on January 28, 2016.356 
 A number of perpetrators have been charged with SGBV crimes by the OTP but remain 
at large. The majority of these cases come from the conflict in Sudan: Omar Al-Bashir;357 Ali 
Kushayb358 and Ahmad Harun;359 Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein.360 Sylvestre 
Mudacumura, a Rwandan national, has been charged by the OTP with nine counts of war 
crimes for his alleged involvement in the conflict in Kivus, Democratic Republic of the 
                                                
353 See: “The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda: Alleged Crimes,” International Criminal Court, accessed 22 April 
2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ntaganda/pages/alleged-crimes.aspx.  
354 Ibid.  
355 See: “The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé: Alleged Crimes,” International Criminal 
Court, accessed 22 April 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-goude/pages/alleged-crimes.aspx.  
356 Ibid. 
357 SGBV charges: rape as a crime against humanity. See: “Al Bashir Case,” International Criminal Court, accessed 
22 April 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir.  
358 SGBV charges: rape as a war crime. See: “Harun and Kushayb Case,” International Criminal Court, accessed 22 
April 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/harunkushayb.  
359 SGBV charges: rape as a war crime and crime against humanity. Ibid.  
360 SGBV charges: rape as a war crime and crime against humanity, outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime. 
See: “Hussein Case,” International Criminal Court, accessed 22 April 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/hussein.  
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Congo.361 Simone Gbagbo, former President Laurent Gbagbo’s wife, faces four counts of war 
crimes including rape and other forms of sexual violence.362 The ICC has issued a warrant for 
her arrest, but she is not in custody. In Sierra Leone, Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti face charges 
at the ICC. Joseph Kony, the Commander-in-Chief of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) faces 
twelve counts of crimes against humanity, including sexual enslavement and rape, and twenty-
one war crimes charges, with rape among the crimes.363 Vincent Otti, the Vice-Chairman and 
Second-In-Command of the LRA faces eleven charges of crimes against humanity and twenty-
one war crimes, including sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity and rape as a war 
crime.364 Kony and Otti are charged in the same case, which originally included Raska Lukwiya 
and Okot Odhiambo. With their deaths, Lukwiya and Odhiambo were removed from the case. 
As the ICC is unable to try perpetrators unless they are present for the proceedings, all of the 
aforementioned cases are unable to continue until the perpetrators are apprehended.  
 
Conclusion 
 In many cases, the International Criminal Court’s prosecution of SGBV crimes has been 
slow. It is important to make note of how long cases often take to go to trial: for example, Jean 
Pierre Bemba was the third case to be tried by the Court, and a verdict was only reached in 2016. 
Although only Bemba’s case has successfully prosecuted SGBV crimes as both war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, it is likely that Ntaganda or Gbagbo and Goudé may face charges of 
                                                
361 SGBV charges: rape as a war crime. See: “Mudacumura Case,” International Criminal Court, accessed 22 April 
2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/mudacumura.  
362 “Simone Gbagbo Case,” International Criminal Court, accessed 22 April 2017, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/cdi/simone-gbagbo.  
363 “Kony et al. Case,” International Criminal Court, accessed 22 April 2017, https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony.  
364 Ibid.  
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SGBV crimes in the near future by the Trial Chamber. The temporal jurisdiction of the ICC 
contributes to the relatively low number of SGBV cases, and cases in general. The ICC is non-
retroactive, and their jurisdiction is two-fold: the Court may prosecute cases occurring either 
after July 1, 2002,365 or sixty days after the Rome Statute enters into force366 if ratification occurs 
after July 1, 2002.367 In the latter case, for new states that become party to the Rome Statute, the 
treaty enters into force on the first day of the month sixty days after ratification, accession, 
approval, or acceptance. Therefore, the number of cases falling under the ICC’s jurisdiction are 
limited to the past fifteen years. The principle of complementarity also curbs the number of cases 
tried by the ICC: by working in tandem with national courts, the Court only seeks to prosecute 
cases in which the national government is unwilling or unable to prosecute. Regardless of the 
number of SGBV cases before the Court, the WCGJ not only fundamentally impacted the ICC 
itself, but also international humanitarian and customary law. As seen with the influence of the 
Lieber Codes on The Hague Conventions, or the IMT and IMTFE on the ad hoc tribunals, 
incremental changes in international law tend to become incorporated and are often expanded 
upon in following bodies of law.  
  
  
                                                
365 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 11. 
366 Through ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.  
367 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 126(2). 
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Conclusion 
This project analyzes the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice at the Rome Conference, 
and places this Caucus within the larger human rights wave of the 1990s. In order to understand 
the WCGJ, the specifics of three crucial events must be parsed through in a critical 
jurisprudential genealogy. These three events — the transnational women’s network at the 
United Nations, the rise of international criminal tribunals, and the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court — are deeply interconnected. In conjunction, the normative shifts 
towards human rights idealism and the justice cascade made it possible for the Women’s Caucus 
for Gender Justice to flourish. Can other networks to use the progression of the Women’s 
Caucus for Gender Justice and the larger transnational women’s network as a model, or was the 
key to the WCGJ’s success their ability to ride the human rights wave of the post-Cold War era? 
The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice experienced overall mixed results in their aim 
for SGBV inclusion and gender mainstreaming. This project focused on six goals (of many): the 
definition of gender and gender violence; delinking honor and dignity; expanding ‘grave 
breaches’; (en)forced pregnancy; sexual slavery; and structural and procedural gender 
mainstreaming. The expansion of gender and gender violence definitions was an overall loss. 
Gender definitions have always been highly contested, exemplified at the Fourth World 
Conference in Beijing with the debate between the transnational women’s network and the 
‘Unholy Alliance’. The definition of gender in the Rome Statute does include the possibility for 
‘gender’ to be viewed within the context of society, salvaging the definition from strictly 
biologically determinist interpretation. As for adding gender violence to the Statute, the WCGJ 
experienced a total loss. The prevailing structuralist-feminist language used in the WCGJ 
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Recommendations on this issue was too extreme for many state delegations to be convinced in 
favor of its inclusion. The WCGJ’s attempt to delink honor and dignity from SGBV crimes was 
successful, evidenced in the separation of articles discussing honor crimes and SGBV. The 
WCGJ was unable to go so far in its delinking process to be able to add SGBV crimes as a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions, and suffered a loss on this issue. Despite this, it is still 
possible to charge SGBV crimes as a constituent crime to a grave breach, as seen with Tadić at 
the ICTY. (En)forced pregnancy experienced mixed success, as it was the result of a compromise 
between the ‘Unholy Alliance’ and more limited in scope. Nonetheless, the WCGJ still 
witnessed a net gain by codifying forced pregnancy. The issue of sexual slavery was mostly a loss 
— the Statute enumerates trafficking and enslavement as crimes, which the WCGJ advocated 
against, but also added sexual slavery as an SGBV crime. As for structural and procedural gender 
mainstreaming, the outcome was quite positive. The Rome Statute contained provisions for 
including women and SGBV specialists as judges, prosecutors, and experts. Although the WCGJ 
experienced mixed results in their goals, it would be unreasonable to expect the Caucus to 
perfectly achieve all the goals they set out to accomplish, especially initiatives with strong 
structuralist language, like gender violence. The WCGJ was reasonably successful in 
incorporating SGBV language into the Rome Statute, despite the obstacles they faced. 
The epochal ruptures of the late twentieth century — the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and of multi-ethnic states — identified by Hoffmann led to the emergence of human rights as a 
solidified structure, an “explanatory framework for understanding what just happened.”368 The 
development of the human rights framework shifted the ways in which humanitarian 
                                                
368 Hoffmann, “Human Rights and History,” 282. 
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interventions as well as international humanitarian law were, and are, justified. Habermas and 
Havel characterize this era as ushering in the value of human rights over the sovereignty of states, 
a fundamental tenet of international law, after the experience of the international community’s 
failure to prevent the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Just as humanitarian 
intervention became normatively justified, legal intervention became justified.  
The experiment of the ad hoc tribunals, a product of the human rights wave, influenced 
and affirmed the path of anti-impunity through the tribunal model. Critics of this move, such as 
Karen Engle, argue that human rights activists took too quickly to incorporating anti-impunity 
prosecution into their repertoire. Instead, I argue that this necessary turn happened due to the 
collapse of the bipolar system. In the rush to salvage the international community’s failures, the 
prosecution of past wrongs was ingrained as a model, first at the ad hoc tribunals and then at the 
ICC. The violence of Srebrenica and Rwanda harkened back to the Holocaust, and the 
subsequent resurgence of Holocaust remembrance connected genocide to human rights. A new 
thirst for prosecution materialized, and the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice was extremely 
fortuitous in throwing itself into the fray.  
The human rights wave was the product of both the overall emergence of human rights 
idealism identified by Hoffmann and Sikkink’s ‘justice cascade.’ The combination of these two 
interrelated phenomena led to the formation of the ad hoc tribunals, the first international 
criminal tribunals since the IMT and IMTFE. Within the framework of legal human rights 
activism, the 1990s drew a unique enthusiasm for increased international intervention. The 
WCGJ found itself able to grow out of and build upon the work done by the transnational 
women’s networks at UN conferences, and took advantage of the increasing involvement of 
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NGOs in treaty making to exert influence at Rome. Given the developments in the early to mid 
1990s that allowed for the rapid development of legal institutions, it would be naïve to suggest 
that the model of the WCGJ can be exactly followed. The three events covered in this project — 
VAW at the UN, the ad hoc tribunals, and the ICC — did not occur consecutively; they 
overlapped and drew direct influence from each other, with main actors often keeping their feet 
in multiple areas. Without the development of gender mainstreaming throughout the twenty 
years prior to Rome, the transnational women’s network would have likely been relegated to the 
peripheral backwaters of the United Nations, limited to ‘women’s only platforms’. Instead, the 
transnational women’s network became a robust nexus for women’s organizing that directly led 
to the inception of the WCGJ at PrepComI. Likewise, the justice cascade of the 1990s that gave 
way to the ad hoc tribunals solidified the foundation of the International Criminal Court. Both 
events drew on a new sense of enthusiasm for human rights — the human rights wave — that 
was a consequence of the epochal ruptures of the late twentieth century. The confluence of these 
three events allowed for the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice to ride the human rights wave 
on tour de force. 
It is of great importance to return to such a normalized phenomenon in human rights 
history. The story of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice is a fascinating study of the state of 
human rights in the 1990s: a unique confluence of events in international law and governance 
provided the WCGJ with a fortuitous opportunity to institutionalize gender into the 
International Criminal Court with a surprising level of success. The WCGJ benefited overall 
from the paradigmatic furor of human rights as a whole and gender mainstreaming at the United 
Nations. Networks looking to the WCGJ cannot draw on the same excitement over anti-
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impunity or operate within the same post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav political climate. Where 
groups may be able to find inspiration, however, is from the tactical side of the WCGJ. Gender 
mainstreaming has since become omnipresent at the United Nations, and activist networks may 
be able utilize this experience. Extensive preparatory work, precedent setting, and the Tribunal 
model at conferences, are all accessible to appropriation by other activist networks. The 
insider/outsider tactic pioneered by WEDO at Rio — organizing from outside governmental 
arenas and lobbying from inside — may certainly be subject to reuse, especially by groups with 
access to preparatory committees and conferences themselves. While other networks may not be 
able to benefit from the political environment that the WCGJ operated within, observant 
networks may be able to pull from the WCGJ’s experience by carefully following its history, 
beginning with Violence against Women at the United Nations.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1 
This n-gram369 illustrates the increasing popularity of terms related to sexual violence. Both 
“sexual violence” and “violence against women” take off in use in the late 1970s, shortly after the 
Mexico City Conference, which failed to adequately address VAW. The use of VAW then 
rapidly increases beginning around 1987, during the apex of talks regarding VAW at UN 
conferences, particularly at Beijing, and briefly dips at 2000. Sexual violence is comparatively less 
popular, but steadily grows in use overtime. Gender violence, on the other hand, is used very 
infrequently and only begins to leave the x-axis after 1990, and slowly gains in usage throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s. Sexual and gender based violence all together was so unused that it could 
not be graphed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
369 Both figures were created with Google Books Ngram Viewer: http://books.google.com/ngrams.  
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Figure 2 
Figure 2* is conveys the steady rise in the term ‘women’s network(s).’ The two are graphed 
separately in order to allow for variation between the singular and plural. In the early 1970s, the 
term enters use and experiences a sharp incline after 1975, the year of Mexico City. ‘Women’s 
network’ (singular) continues to rise and peaks in 1996, a year after Beijing. ‘Women’s networks’ 
(plural) is used less than its singular form, but still experiences growth until 1996. After which, 
the usage of ‘women’s network(s)’ tends to wane.  
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